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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents the results of a study of the
initial financing of new firms based on scientific or engi-
neering developments, in the New England area. As a part
of this study, an interview survey was undertaken, in which
the author interviewed twenty-five individuals with res-
ponsibility for investing their own funds or the funds of
others in this type enterprise.
The objectives of the study were basically threefold:
to identify the major sources of initial venture capital in
this region's new technical industries, to assess these sources'
present methods and policies in supplying this capital, and to
judge the effectiveness of some particular research methods
which build upon the direct personal interview. The study is
intended primarily for two audiences: the present and po-
tential investors and entrepreneurs in new research-based
enterprises.
Part One of the study addresses itself to the general
considerations of the venture capital market, and attempts a
distinction between initial and subsequent venture capital
supplied to the growing firm. Substantial attention is given
to the identity and characteristics of the different groups
of indiviauals who supply initial venture capital. The role
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of the venture capital firms in this specialized market is
discussed, with emphasis upon the reasons for their present
non-participation in initial financing, and upon their im-
portant role in the market as communications centers. The
present availability of initial venture capital is the
subject of a brief chapter.
Part Two is concerned with the decision to invest
in the new venture situation, and with the various com-
ponents of that decision: the way opportunities are
identified by investors, the appraisal process, the in-
vestor's motivations including various tax incentives,
the risk-estimation process, the decision to participate
in management, and finally, some appraisal of how in-
vestors define success and how well they do in attaining
it.
The study revealed a good many interesting facts
about this highly-specialized sector of the capital mar-
ket, as well as supplying evidence to support or refute
a number of fairly common beliefs about the venture
capitalist. The study cast doubt upon the effectiveness
of some present tools of decision theory in the appraisal
of risk-taking behavior among this type of investor. It
also supplied evidence that the personal interview, while
limited in effectiveness, may be the most effective way to
study this population.
Thesis Supervisor: Daniel M. Holland
Title: Professor of Industrial Management
Thesis Committee Member: Richard S. Morse
Title: Lecturer in Industrial Management
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Part One:
THE PROBLEM AND THE STUDY
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
"We are not here to sell a parcel of boilers and
vats, but the potentiality of growing rich beyond
the dreams of avarice."
-Samuel Johnson1
In undertaking any investigation, it is the investigator's
burden not only to observe, report, and interpret the facts, but
also to defend the salience of the subject he has chosen to in-
vestigate. In an area which abounds in investigations and litera-
ture as does "small business," this second responsibility becomes
the more insistent. We should begin, then, by defining not only
the subject and scope of the present study, but also the circum-
stances which justify its having been undertaken at all.
The subject of this investigation is the process by which
capital is directed to the fledgling research-based enterprise in
the New England area. Investments by private individuals have
received the major emphasis, and in particular, the resources,
attitudes, and motivations which have made such investments
possible.
1 James Boswell, Life of Samuel Johnson, London, 1781.
(Samuel Johnson presiding at the sale of Thule's Brewery)
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The population studied in this survey is comprised of
the individuals who, in the past five years, have provided some
or all of.the initial equity capital for one or more new research-
based enterprises in the New England area. The sample of that
population studied was a group of twenty-five individuals, ten
known or believed to have invested their own funds, and fifteen,
funds for which they had responsibility, in such situations.
The Subject
The literature on the financing of small and new enter-
prise is an enormous and varied one, and is but a minor subset of
a still larger literature on small business as an entity. The
bulk of this literature probably has its origins somewhere in the
American economic tradition, an element of which runs to the effect
that if private capitalism and individual initiative are the basic
foundations of our economy and society, then small business per se
comprises an essential component of that society and deserves en-
couragement. This literature was already large by 1957; there-
after its growth was accelerated by the studies, investigations,
hearings, and reports which attended the enactment of the "Small
Business Investment Act of 1958." That the literature is already
so vast makes some justification of the present addition the more
imperative.
The new research-based enterprise (which will occasionally
be referred to throughout as NRBE) was selected for study as an
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unique and important component of the small business population.
A working definition of the NRBE is given by Rubinstein2 as follows.
"The unique features of the new research-based
enterprise are:
1) that it is generally trying to do some-
thing no one has done before and 2) that it
is generally headed by technical people, often
with little or no previous business experience
....(their objectives include):
a) the exploitation of a new product, process
or service developed in the laboratory which
had not yet been utilized commercially; or
b) the expectation that new products, processes,
or services would be developed by their labora-
tories, once they were in business; or
c) joining in the further development of a new
scientific or technological field which was
still in the early stages of exploitation."
The NRBE is unique among small businesses for two reasons.
First, it has an unusual social role as an incubator of new tech-
nologies, many of which are too speculative to be included on the
project portfolios of larger, more conservative companies, yet too
valuable to remain in the corporate or university laboratory.
Second, it is distinguished from the more typical small business
(e.g. drug stores and service stations) by its potential for sub-
stantial growth, should it succeed. Concurrently, we would expect
the risks to be greater in the NRBE, although the only government
2 Albert H. Rubinstein, Problems of Financing and Managing New Re-
search-Enterprises in New England, an unpublished research report
to the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1958.
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statistics available do not separate failure records of NRBE's from
those of other small firms to permit a comparison.
New England was selected as the region to be studied, for
reasons of the author's personal convenience and because the NRBE
has played an unusually important role in the area since World War II.
The disbanding of the large defense laboratories of Harvard and M.I.T.
at the War's end, the availability of excess capacity in the metals
fabricating trades, and the employment vacuum created by the de-
parture of the textile industry, created together a fertile seed-
bed for new, technically-oriented firms. The success of some early
ones created the climate of expectation which led to the establish-
ment of still more until something like a self-sustaining reaction
was achieved, supported by the intellectual capital of the uni-
versities and the financial capital of the community. Rubinstein
estimates that by 1957 between 300 and 400 such firms had been es-
tablished in New England; the figure has probably at least doubled
since then.
The initial capitalization of these firms, as opposed to
secondary and later financing, has been singled out for investi-
gation for two reasons, one substantive and the other academic.
The substantive reason is that, in all of the literature on the
financing of small and new enterprise, almost no attention is paid
-5-
3Rubinstein, op. cit.
to the problem of initial capitalization of such firms, in spite
of the enormous importance of this first capital. Its influence
is inestimable in terms of what the company will be, who will
control it, what its future capital structure will be, and whose
interests it will ultimately serve. Perhaps its light treatment
in the literature may be attributed to the fact that secondary fi-
nancing and initial public stock issues tend to exhibit some regularity
of pattern, as well as convenience of reference materials, whereas
initial financing seems sometimes to obey only the second law of
thermodynamics, to the very great frustration of anyone who has
ever attempted to generalize on the subject.
The other reason for selecting initial capitalization is the
fact that so doing extricates the author from the usual embroilment
of defining exactly what is meant by "small" or "new" business.
Various investigators have based their definitions on assets,
sales, net worth, equity capitalization, number of stockholders,
number employed, and even years established. Each definition has
merits and disadvantages relative to the others, but all introduce
an undesirable element of arbitrariness into the specification of
population. By concentrating study upon the initial outside
capitalization, these problems of definition were largely side-
stepped. However, new problems of definition arose in their place.
Just what is meant by initial outside capitalization? What if the
initial capital comes from the rich uncle of the entrepreneur --
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is it still outside? What if it comes from the entrepreneur's own
assets? The answer appears to be that outside is not a useful
concept -- that the investment decision made by an individual
entrepreneur is no different in kind from a decision made by a
venture capital firm. The difference lies simply in the moti-
vation and decision processes that precede it.
The Population Sample
Investigations by Rubinstein,4 the Federal Reserve System 5
and others revealed that the individual private investor is indis-
putably the most important source of initial equity capital for
the new firm. It was the author's intention to build upon this
finding, and design a study based exclusively upon interviews-with
private individuals investing primarily on their own account. In
practice, however, such a sharp definition of "venture capitalist"
is both unrealistic and difficult to maintain. One quickly dis-
covers, for example, that some of the most affluent and sophisti-
cated individual venture capitalists are aligned in family groups
which in turn are represented by highly professional private in-
vestment staffs. Such organizations, in turn, share many methods,
communications channels and selection criteria with the publicly-
Rubinstein, op. cit.
5 U. S. Federal Reserve System, Financing Small Business, a report
to the Committees on Banking and Currency and the Select Com-
mittees on Small Business, U. S. Congress, 1958.
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-held venture investment firms and Small Business Investment
Corporations, with whom they are in rather direct competition.
Thus, a continuum exists in "privateness"and "individuality"
among suppliers of venture capital, and this must be repre-
sented in any sample purporting to typify the population.
The sample size of twenty-five individuals was not
selected in the belief that it was adequate in any sense to
permit the drawing of firm statistical conclusions on any of
the subjects discussed. It was selected rather as a tractable
number to be interviewed within the time and financial con-
straints of this study, yet one which would permit the author
to test a number of widely-held ideas on venture capital, and to
unearth whatever facts about the operation of this segment of the
capital market appeared interesting and new to the literature.
The effective size of the sample studied was increased beyond
its actual size, to the extent that the subjects interviewed were
willing to discuss the investment policies of their colleagues,
comparing and contrasting them to their own. Thus, while the
study "proves" nothing in the hypothesis-testing sense, it does
provide fairly substantive support for most of the assertions
made in the pages that follow.
The sample was identified by a process which was quite
unrelated to random selection. A small group of known investors
was identified at the outset and contacted. Each of these, in
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turn, was asked to suggest one or two additional investors to
be contacted, so that the sample was in some sense self-selected,
Two interesting facts emerged from this process. First, while it
was expected that the subjects would tend to suggest other indi-
viduals much like themselves, this did not prove to be the case;
a remarkable heterogeneity of investor types emerged from this
process. Second, it became clear after several cycles of referral
that the author was following very much the same sort of path
through the financial community that the entrepreneur might
follow in his search for capital for a risky new venture. While
this process of identification and referral could probably be
continued indefinitely, there were some indications late in the
study of a sort of convergence, in which one or two of those
persons suggested would already have been contacted.
The following tables classify the various investors inter-
viewed by profession, education, and age.
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES OF INVESTOR SAMPLE
Profession Number Percent
Investment Banking Firms (Partners and Officers) 7 25
S.B.I.C. Officers 6 21
Officers of Industrial Firms 5 18
Family Investment Group Representatives 4 14
Investment Company Officers 2 7
Commercial Bank Officers 2 7
Academic Consultants 1 4
Insurance Company Officers 1 4
28 100
Note: Three subjects are counted in two professional groups.
Total subjects equals twenty-five.
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EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF INTERVIEW
Background (highest attainment)
Graduate School of Business Administration
Liberal Arts College
Engineering or Science
*
SUBJECTS
Number
11
10
4
25
Percent
44
40
16
100
*
Based upon knowledge or assumption of author.
ESTIMATED AGES OF INTERVIEW SUBJECTS
Age Number Percent
61 - 70 7 28
51 - 60 6 24
41 - 50 3 12
31 - 40 6 24
21 - 30 3 12
25 100
Refer to Appendix 1 for further details regarding population sample.
The Audience
It is hoped that this document will prove to be of interest
to at least two groups: present and potential NRBE investors, and
present and potential NRBE entrepreneurs.
Investors of the sorts interviewed may find it interesting
to compare their own individual policies and attitudes with those of
their peers; moreover, some of the experience of interviewing suggests
to the author the view that a good many investors might gain a better
understanding of the process in which they are involved by reading
such a document. In particular, it is hoped that the sections on
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project appraisal, taxes, and risk assessment may prove to be of
some value to the investors.
The present or potential entrepreneur may constitute the
more important audience for the study. To the new, would-be
technical entrepreneur, money tends to be money, no matter where
it comes from. Typically, there is on his part very little aware-
ness or appreciation of the enormous differences which exist be-
tween the various types of venture capital -- differences in basic
investor motivation, differences in control demanded, differences
in managerial help supplied, in expectations as to time and payoff,
and in total funds ultimately available from the source. He can
only benefit from whatever knowledge he can gain of his future
capital suppliers. Armed with some information, his search for
backing is likely to be more successful, and certain to be more
efficient, than without it.
The Interviews
The experience of Rubinstein, Herrmann, Butters, the U. S.
Federal Reserve System, and others, suggests that the personal
interview is the most efficient, and perhaps the only way to
assemble the sorts of information needed in such a study. Written
questionnaires appeared to be ruled out by the small population
being studied, since even a ten percent return is exceptional for
a long questionnaire. Moreover, the written questionnaire is a
very poor instrument for the measurement of motivation.
-11-
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Thus it was concluded that a personal interview survey
was the appropriate research vehicle for this topic. Also, it
was concluded that a highly-specified interview format, such as
that used by Butters, Thompson, and Bollinger in cooperation with
the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan6 should
be developed.
It was felt that such a series of questions, if well
worked-out, could provide a uniform basis of comparison between
interviews. Such an interview format was developed (see Appendix 2)
but it did not prove to be successful, and was subsequently aban-
doned. The use of a highly-structured set of questions seemed
only to destroy the sense of spontaneity and personal involvement
exhibited by many of the subjects. The most successful interviews
were those in which the objectives of the study were briefly ex-
plained, and in which the subject took most of the initiative.
If any of the topics of interest were omitted, a question or two
usually evoked a relevant response. The subjects were informed
by letter that the interview should last only about an hour; in
practice, however, very few were shorter than an hour and a half,
and a few ran as long as two and a half hours, Almost without ex-
ception, the subjects were cordial, interested, and candid in their
observations. This, of course, made the study much more pleasant
for the author than it might otherwise have been.
6 J. K. Butters, L. E. Thompson and L. L. Bollinger, Effects of Tax-
ation-Investments by Individuals, Division of Research, Graduate
School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1953.
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Summary by Chapter
"What did you find out?" is a question which the remainder
of this document will be devoted to answering. Following, however,
is a chapter-by-chapter summary of the study, which may have the
effect either of encouraging or discouraging the reader's perusal
of it in its entirety.
Chapter II: Who are the Investors?
The most important source of initial equity capital for the NRBE
appears to be the affluent individual investor. He tends to be
in the highest wealth category, to have a predominantly liberal-
arts background, and to be employed in the financial community;
he is most likely between ages thirty-five and fifty-five. He
may be motivated by both economic and non-economic considerations;
the economic include primarily tax saving or amelioration and
capital appreciation, while the non-economic encompass an
enormous range of motivations.
Chapter III: The Role of the Venture Capital Organization
The venture capital organizations include primarily the closed-end
investment company, the Small Business Investment Company, and the
family investment group. None constitutes an important source of
initial NRBE backing, primarily for reasons of risk and minimum
economic investment considerations. While some have at one time
or another provided initial NRBE capital, the practice has largely
been discontinued. These groups perform an important function as
-13-
communications centers between ideas and private money.
Chapter IV: The Availability of Initial Venture Capital
There appears to be at least as much capital potentially available
for venture investments today as ever before. However, the terms
on which it is available, and the standards by which projects are
being judged both appear to be stiffer than only a few years ago.
Thus the quantity of venture funds being supplied is probably
lower than it has been in recent years. The private individual
is not only more likely to supply initial funds than the venture
capital group, but he is also more likely to supply funds to any
venture on more liberal terms.
Chapter V: What the Investor Looks For
The most important component of a proposal to most investors appears
to be the people involved - their managerial and technical compe-
tence. It is important that both kinds of skills exist in the foun-
der or founding group. The market for the innovation is also a
topic of concern; nearly all investors prefer that the market be
growing, although all don't insist on it. Some distinct attitudes
toward different technologies appeared in the study, suggesting
that different investors often specialize in particular areas of
technology. The product within that technology may be big or
small in terms of dollars per unit - but if its big, the capital
market usually insists that prototype and development shall have
been done on someone else's money (e.g. a university's, a company's,
-14-
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or the Government's). Finally, there appears to be no lower limit
on the initial investment size, but most appear to run between
$50,000 and $200,000.
Chapter VI: Identifying Investment Opportunities
It appears that the financial community is fairly effective at
putting people with ideas in touch with people with money. Re-
ferral of the entrepreneur from one type of investor to another
seems to be a major mechanism of communication. "Finders" are
still active in the financial community, and can sometimes per-
form valuable sources in obtaining capital. While a few investors
engage in an active search process, looking for promising situations,
most are basically passive and look mainly at projects that get re-
ferred to them by associates.
Chapter VII: The Estimation of Risk
The study of the conceptualization of risk by risk takers provides
a basis for looking at venture capitalists. Several models of
investor risk appraisal are advanced; the most likely one says
he makes an objective estimate of potential payoff and a sub-
jective estimate of the probability of that payoff occurring.
The investor's major hedge against uncertainty seems to be the
application of standards to particular aspects of the new venture -
standards based on industry rate-of-return, length of time organ-
ized, potential market, etc. The process of examining proposals
to see if standards are met is rather different for institutional
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as compared with private investors. Venture capital groups tend
to rely on market analysts, technical consultants, etc., in their
appraisal whereas individual investors rely quite heavily on the
judgment of their friends. They also tend to rely on their
ability to judge the people who are running the enterprise.
Chapter VIII: The Role of Taxes
The federal income tax has two major effects on the investor: it
decreases his ability to invest in new ventures, but increases
his willingness. Only the second appears to have much relevance
to the investment decision, however. The prospect of substantial
capital gains, with their liberal tax treatment, appears to be a
major incentive to investment. Peripheral tax incentives intro-
duced in the "Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (i.e., "Section
1244," and "Subchapter S") appear to have very little influence on
the investment decision.
Chapter IX: Participation in Management
Investors may choose to participate in the management of the enter-
prise because they like to, or because they feel they have to to
protect their investment. Most decisions to participate seem to
contain components of each. Venture capital groups often have
formal participation arrangements based on self-protection, whereas
private individuals seem to prefer either a paid, full-time position,
or an internal advisor's role. In either case, participation by the
investor can be a valuable source of management assistance, as well
-16-
as of contacts in the financial, commercial, and legal worlds.
Chapter X: Definition and Attainment of Success
There seem to be several prevailing definitions of "success" in
addition to the customary rate-of-return criteria; most of these
are non-economic and highly individualistic. Twenty percent per
year was mentioned several times as a good appreciation rate, but
it is doubtful that this is more than a sort of average expectation.
The success records of the venture capital organizations exhibit
great diversity; certain groups appear to have done reasonably
well by the investors they represent, whereas others have done
quite poorly. An attempt was made to appraise the experience of
a subsample of the individuals interviewed, with respect to their
success in personal NRBE investment. The results suggest that
individuals who go into enough situations to permit averaging
to function may actually do better than the process mean. Finally,
some ideas were advanced on the problems associated with getting
out of the maturing venture.
Conclusion
The results summarized in the preceding section were based
entirely upon an examination of conditions in the New England
capital market (and to a lesser extent, the New York market). How-
ever, I believe that they apply with some generality to other parts
of the country. Several of the findings are rather highly inter-
pretive, based upon my inferences rather than on straightforward
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statements by my interview subjects. However, I have attempted
throughout to indicate where this was the case, and have resorted
to it only where it appeared unavoidable in interpreting one or
another of the phenomena that appeared during my study.
A word on the research method employed is in order. The
non-directed interview is a rather blunt research tool in the
hands of any but a trained psychologist; the author proved to be
no exception. However, spontaneity of response and gratuitous
reference to facts unknown to me were the rewards for its use in
my study. The price was the loss of an opportunity to ask the same
questions of every interview subject thus enabling me to cross-
tabulate and correlate replies in the familiar manner so dear to
the academician. I consider the loss a small one, inasmuch as the
sample of investors turned out to be so heterogeneous as to have
made such comparisons useless anyway. I must confess that I wish
I had been able, during the study, to think of a better method of
research to recommend to future students of the subject. Unfor-
tunately, I was not.
lut the possible areas for further research in the area
of new enterprise financing are many. Particularly fertile areas
lie in analysing the investor's conceptualization of risk, and in
the measurement of the effect of taxes upon his investment decisions.
It is my opinion, however that the major future empirical contri-
butions in each of these areas will be made by social scientists,
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trained perhaps in psychology or psychometry. The investigator
trained only in management science is on very soft ground indeed
when he tries to separate a man's real motivations from his re-
ported ones, as he is on any other occasion that he tries to
probe the attitudes, motivations and feelings of anything as
fascinating and frustratingly complex as another human being.
-19-
Chapter II
WHO ARE THE INVESTORS?
"At one time or another...the following types
of individuals and organizations were reported
to supply venture funds for promising growth
situations: wealthy individuals, family es-
tates, partners and associates in investment-
banking houses, investment-banking firms for
their own account, closed-end investment dom-
panies, outright venture capital firms, pension
funds, nonfinancial corporations seeking di-
versification, dissatisfied corporate officers,
wealthy men seeking active management roles,
and others....Though this list is impressively
long, the interviewers concluded that wealthy
men - whether as individuals, as partners in
investment-banking houses, or as corporate
officers - are the backbone of this market."1
The Federal Reserve System's study quoted above, while
it did not attempt to distinguish between ordinary small busi-
ness and small business of exceptional growth potential (e.g.
NRBE's), went directly to the heart of the matter in asserting
the importance of the wealthy individual in the financing of
new enterprise. The present study not only provides supporting
evidence for this conclusion, but also indicates that the wealthy
individual investor is relatively even more important in the
population studied in this investigation, the suppliers of
1 U. S. Federal Reserve System, Financing Small Business, report
to Congressional Committees, 1958, p. 529.
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initial capital to NRBE's.
The importance of the wealthy individual in initial fi-
nancing of the NRBE, relative to that of investment companies,
venture capital firms, Small Business Investment Corporations,
and other organizations, has two major explanations. First, the
initial capitalization of a new venture is simply too risky for
the usual venture capital organization. Since the market shake-
out of May 1962, nearly every such organization has adopted an
explicit policy of "no initial capital." Though an occasional
exception is made, according to two of the interview subjects
the role of the venture capital organizations in such situations
today is almost nonexistent. Second, possibly more important, is
the nature of the individual investor himself. His tax structure
normally favors speculative investment, he is typically accountable
only to himself for his actions, he can afford the inevitable
occasional loss, and he often has motivations for investing
which are not strictly economic.
Investor Activity
The sample of individuals interviewed included primarily
what might be called the "active investor" - that is the individual
who personally finds, investigates, finances, and follows the
venture situation. These people, due to their activity in the
financial community, are relatively easy to identify and contact.
Another group of investors which probably at least equals the first
-21-
in terms of total financial contribution to venture situations,
is what might be called the "passive investor" group - individuals
who take little active part in the search and appraisal process,
who entrust, this, and possibly even the decision, to hired pro-
fessionals. While these investors are sometimes possible to
identify, they are less generally accessible to the investigator
and probably less interesting due to the very passive nature of
their role. Thus, their investment policies and motivations can
only be inferred from the policies and histories of the groups
that represent them. The "passive investor" group includes a
number of family investment groups, holders of stock in Small
Business Investment Corporations and certain closed-end in-
vestment companies, as well as individuals represented individually
by private investment counsellors. Together, the active and
passive private individuals supply virtually all of the initial
capital to new technical enterprises in the New England area.
Investor Resources
Another important dimension in identifying the private
venture capitalist is his financial capacity. This, in turn can
be specified further as net worth and income. During the study,
no explicit efforts were made to determine either of these for
the interview subjects, although some evidence is available for
estimating income via tax bracket.
The net worth of investing individuals is a difficult
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parameter to measure because it is a rather confidential subject
among most wealthy persons, in addition to the fact that wealth
is hard to define, especially when it consists of non-liquid
assets. Butters. Thompson, and Bollinger,2 in their rather ex-
tensive study, were able to classify their sample of individuals
making any kind of investments of 746 into the following wealth
categories:
DISTRIBUTION OF NET WORTH IN HARVARD STUDY SAMPLE
Number Percent
Under $25,000 142 19
$25,000 - 49,999 117 16
$50,000 - 99,999 120 16
$100,000 - 249,999 149 20
$250,000 - 499,999 71 9
$500,000 - 999,999 37 5
$1,000,000 and over 40 5
Not ascertained 70 9
This was a rather early (1949) study and the sample may not be
entirely representative today; however, it does give the reader
some feeling for the distribution of wealth among individual
investors.
They did not correlate investor participation in new
ventures with wealth, as they did with income. However, if one
2
J. K. Butters, L. E. Thompson and L. L. Bollinger, Effects of
Taxation-Investments by Individuals, Division of Research, Graduate
School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1953.
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is willing to make the fairly reasonable assumption that income
is rather highly correlated with wealth, one can make some rough
estimates of the importance of personal wealth in specifying the
identity of the venture capitalist.
Total wealth influences investment in two ways, both
somewhat independent of annual income. First, it is the primary
determinent of capacity to invest, not just initially, but through-
out the growth of the enterprise. Second, total wealth may be ex-
pected to have a substantial influence upon willingness to invest
in risk situations, to the extent that the utility of additional
profits is affected by present accumulations.
High annual income is the other distinguishing economic
feature of the venture capitalist group. To the extent that the
progressive income tax penalizes the individual who attempts to
increase his annual personal income, the capital-gains tax
structure makes it logical for him to invest in risk and growth
situations. Butters, Thompson, and Bollinger3 reported the
following correlation of income to attitude toward new ventures
among their sample of individuals who invest in all kinds of
situations:
Butters, Thompson and Bollinger, op. cit.
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ATTITUDE TOWARD NEW VENTURES
OF INDIVIDUALS IN HARVARD STUDY SAMPLE,
BY INCOME GROUPS
Number Attitude Toward New Ventures
Income Group of Cases Unfavorable Neutral Favorable Total
Under $,500 201 45% 29% 26% 100%
$7,500 - 12,499 182 39 26 35 100
$12,500 - 24,999 159 36 22 42 100
$25,000 - 49,999 120 43 14 43 100
$50,000 - 99,999 46 35 10 55 100
$100,000 and over 26 52 0 48 100
Attitude is not, of course, the equivalent of participation,
but is certainly a major determinent. The important finding here is
that evidence exists to support the commonly-held view that the higher
income individual is more likely to be interested in venture invest-
ments than the individual of less income. Evidence was found through-
out the present study to support this conclusion.
Background and Education
The background and educational experience of the venture
investor is probably not too much different from that of most wealthy
Americans, with a few notable exceptions. The most common case is
that in which wealth is inherited; in this case the most typical
pattern appears to be a liberal-arts Ivy League education, per-
haps augmented by business school training, followed by some years
in the financial community of New York or Boston.
The other pattern of background emerging from the study
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was one of self-made affluence. But among the sample interviewed,
perhaps 15% fall in a group whose affluence was self-made. Their
education is likely to be technical, and the investor has typi-
cally been a technical entrepreneur at some time in his career.
This fact is likely to be responsible for his wealth; it is also
likely to explain his interest in new research-based venture in-
vestments, and his emotional commitment to them, which may well
outweigh the economic considerations involved. In support of
this general profile, it is interesting to observe the finding of
Butters, et al, that the second highest, not the highest, income
group exhibits the greatest interest in new ventures. If one is
willing to assume that this second highest group probably includes
more of the self-made men than the highest wealth group, the evi-
dence supports the contention that such men are highly interested
in the new venture.
The occupations of the sample interviewed in this study
were very widely assorted, as was noted in Chapter I. However,
there were strong indications that the congenitally affluent
group tended to be most professionally active in the investment
and investment-banking fields, whereas the self-made capitalists
tended to retain their identity with industry, as presidents,
board chairmen, and senior entrepreneurs.
Investor Age
The age of the active investor in the NRBE is another
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dimension worthy of some note. Several of the men interviewed
indicated that they had at one time been far more active than
they were at present in the backing of new enterprises. Butters
et al4 reported a very significant correlation between youth and
interest in new ventures:
Age
Under 35 y
35 - 44
45 - 54
55 - 64
65 and ove
ATTITUDE TOWARD NEW VENTURES OF
INDIVIDUALS IN HARVARD STUDY SAMPLE, BY AGE
Number Attitude Toward
of Cases Unfavorable Neutral
ears 54 19% 34%
147 31 27
209 41 18
199 42 25
r 131 64 17
New Ventures
Favorable
47%
42
41
33
19
In participation (as opposed to favorable attitude), the correlation
might be somewhat less, due to the fact that, on the average, the
older man has greater financial capacity than the younger. None-
theless, it was the consensus of several of the senior men inter-
viewed that backing new ventures was a young man's game. Not only
does venture financing require great energy and enthusiasm, but it
also requires waiting five to ten years for results. As one elder
investor interviewed put it,
Butters, Thompson and Bollinger, op. cit., p. 261.
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Total
100%
100
100
100
100
"I'm too old for this game now. I see plenty of
situations I'd have invested in ten years ago,
but I can't wait ten years for a situation to
mature."
In the sample interviewed, the men most active in new venture fi-
nancing were probably between the ages of thirty-five and fifty-
five, though the distribution was evidently skewed to the right.
Basic Investor Motivation
It is in this area that the author finds himself on the
softest ground in attempting to generalize about the population
under study. It was his intent in every interview to discern to
what degree the investor was motivated by calculated economic con-
siderations, and to what degree by noneconomic motives. This
turned out in practice to be rather more difficult than it
sounds.
In a very few instances it was possible to infer directly
from the interview content that the motivation to invest in new
ventures was entirely economic, or entirely emotional. In the
greater number of cases, however, a balance existed which was
often difficult to specify. The most usual reason for this is
the tendency of such men to view themselves as hard-headed
businessmen, and to de-emphasize the noneconomic component of their
investment decisions. It was important in most instances to try
to distinguish candid statements of motivation from those made
"just for the record."
-28-
In certain instances the subject would explain in great
detail the economic considerations, tax implications, etc., under-
lying his investment decisions, and then end by admitting that he
considered such investment a terrible risk, and that he only in-
vested for the fun of gambling. Or, another answer encountered
more than once was that, while he considered himself to be basically
economically motivated, he thought that most of his colleagues just
did it for fun. One more candid investor put it this way:
"With most of these guys, the real motivation is
the emotional association, like backing a winner
at the races. Money is just the excuse they give
their wives."
The Federal Reserve System's 1958 study, Financing Small
Business,5 reported (correctly, in the author's opinion) that
"Some of the persons who invest small amounts in
struggling little businesses appear to do so
partly for noneconomic reasons. They may do it
because they like "to take a flyer," to defy
cooly calculated probability. They are ex-
hilarated by the business process, like to get
involved in management problems, and enjoy com-
peting. Some wealthy men take seriously the
social responsibility of wealth; they believe
that they should invest in small businesses and
be helpful to small businessmen for these reasons."
5 U. S. Federal Reserve System, Financing Small Business, A report
to the Committees on Banking and Currency and the Select Committees
on Small Business, U. S. Congress, 1958.
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If any valid generalization at all about NRBE investor
motivation is possible, it is probably that economic motivation
varies from zero to one hundred percent. One of the fundamental
questions to be asked by any entrepreneur approaching a potential
capital source is "What is this investor's motivation?". Because
of the large and unknowable risks associated with initial capitali-
zation of research-based firms, it would be reasonable to assume
that most of the people who finance such situations probably aren't
economically motivated. This is not altogether true, however, since
the author identified several individuals and groups who invest for
the cooly calculated reason that they have almost nothing to lose,
under the tax provisions of the Small Business Investment Act of
1958 (discussed at length later), although they are not especially
interested in small business or research per se. Moreover, it would
be most naive to expect even an investor of 100 percent noneconomic
motivation to be foolish, and very few are. Their criteria for
project selection, in terms of capable people, technical promise
and market potential, are probably just as stringent as those of
the most highly profit-motivated groups. For the only way for
either type to measure success or failure is profit.
If any tendency can be identified, it is that the inves-
tors represented by professional staffs tend to make the more
rationally economic decisions, while the private individual
investor appears more likely to do if for fun. As noted earlier,
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a technically and industrially oriented individual may make
slightly more rational decisions, but his motivation and record
are probably little different from that of his colleague in the
financial world. It is not possible to estimate the distribution
of investor motivation from available information.
The following principal motivations were identified
during the course of the study; while it is possible to list
these factors, it is extremely difficult to assess their rela-
tive importance in the total market for initial venture capital.
The list should be interesting, however, if only for its diversity.
Economic Factors:
1. Realizing capital gains, taxable at a lower rate
than personal income.
2. Obtaining virtually "heads-I-win" status under
certain sections of the Internal Revenue Code.
3. Growing new customers for commercial banking
and investment banking businesses.
4. Protecting heirs against losses in inheritance
taxes.
5. Developing a technological capability suitable
for annexation to existing investments.
Non-economic Factors:
1. Gaining the sense of excitement inherent in
risk-taking.
2. Participating in a growing enterprise.
3. Gaining the satisfactions of helping to
manage the enterprise, of "doing something
useful."
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4. Fulfilling a belief in the social responsi-
bility of wealth.
5. Helping small businessmen get started be-
cause they need help.
6. Asserting a belief in new technical enter-
prise as an important element in the economy.
7. Keeping up with the Whitneys.
In reality, it is probably impossible to partition motivation, and
particularly non-economic motivation, in this way. Most investors
represent some combination of several of these, in proportions of
which they themselves are quite unaware. Moreover, it is probably
inaccurate, though enticingly feasible, to accept an investor's
ex post appraisal of his motivation in a particular investment,
when what one would really like to know is, "What were his moti-
vations when he went into it?".
The Corporations as Venture Capitalists
Before leaving the question of the initial investor's
identity, it is appropriate to mention still another source of
venture capital - the established industrial corporation.
This source is probably growing more rapidly in importance
than any other sector of the venture capital market, and the balance
sheets of an ever-increasing number of established technically-ori-
ented firms include investments in speculative new technical enter-
prises. The roster includes several well-known firms, such as
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Union Carbide, Aerojet General, du Pont, Paramount, Western
Electric, and CBS. Their influence may be expected to make
itself felt in New England as well as other regions.
There are several reasons why an established in-
dustrial firm might be interested inbacking a new technical
venture. First, a mature organization often finds that it has
generated cash faster than it has generated opportunities for
its profitable reinvestment. It frequently makes sense to risk
some of it on a venture which has the possibility of becoming
either a salable asset for the realization of capital gains, or
a subsidiary company with a high earnings rate. Another reason
is that the older company wants to cover its bets technically -
to back a number of competent outside groups in several new
technologies, so that the firm will have access to technical
competence in the areas that acquire commercial importance.
Another reason for such participation in NRBE's is that some
mature technically-oriented firms feel that they are incapable
of attracting technical people in the quality and calibre they
need. Since such people frequently find the equity participation,
informality and flexibility in the small company to be the most
congenial work atmosphere, the mature firm reasons that it should
encourage the small firm in the hope of maintaining an affiliation
with it. Finally, the firm may simply want an affiliate somewhere
near a center of technological activity (e.g. Boston or Palo Alto).
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Whatever the reasons, the older firms are stepping up
their search efforts to locate promising technical groups. Several
have small professional staffs with just this assignment. These
staffs, unlike the staff of the typical venture capital organi-
zation discussed in the next chapter, can pursue an aggressive
search without being buried in a flood of unpromising and un-
solicited proposals from every quarter.
The arrangements for participation by the mature firm are
many. The firm may simply purchase a bloc of stock outright. It
may lend money on some convertible basis. It may simply pay the
bills of the new technical firm, charging it as current expense
and hoping to acquire stock on options if the venture succeeds.
The parent company may participate substantially in the technical
and managerial affairs of the venture, or not as all - depending
upon the capabilities of the parent firm and the needs of the new
enterprise.
In conclusion, this source of venture capital is growing,
and may be expected to continue to grow, particularly in view of
the threats posed to defense contractors by disarmament movements.
The search for new technologies with potential civilian markets
may be expected to grow more aggressive among the defense con-
tractors. Opportunities already exist for research in this
field of venture capitalism, and will almost certainly multiply
in the next several years.
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Chapter III
THE ROLE OF THE VENTURE CAPITAL ORGANIZATIONS
"Financing the initial phase: A few - very few -
have been financed by venture capital organi-
zations. In most cases, such organizations will -
by their own rules - avoid such initial financing.
They explain this in various ways, most of them
amounting to a belief that the entrepreneurs ought
to have something tangible or at least something
specific to talk about before they come looking
for backing. In addition, this initial investment
of time and energy is taken by some of the po-
tential backers as an evidence of good faith on
the part of the entrepreneurs - indicating that
they are making a sacrifice in order to start the
new venture." 1
This observation by Professor Rubinstein although based
on conditions existing prior to the enactment of the Small Busi-
ness Investment Act of 1958, is at least as valid today as then.
Virtually no initial financing is being obtained by entrepreneurs
from the venture capital organizations of Greater Boston and New
York. To understand why this is true, it will be helpful to be-
gin with a brief discussion of the most important types of venture
capital organizations.
1 Albert H. Rubinstein, Problems of Financing and Managing New
Research-Based Enterprises in New England, an unpublished re-
port to the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1958.
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In this discussion, we shall consider principally
three types of venture capital organization: the closed-end
investment company, the Small Business Investment Company
(SBIC), and the family investment organization. There have
been several other forms of venture capital groups organized
in the past, including investment clubs, syndicates, partner-
ships, pools, trusts, and other forms. However, if such combi-
nations were ever of much importance, they are not today and
for this reason are not discussed with the three major types.
Closed-End Investment Companies
The closed-end investment company is normally under-
stood to be a company which, through diversification of in-
vestments among many types of companies, hopes to secure for
its stockholders a fairly steady-growth-rate, approximating
perhaps the Dow-Jones average but with the smaller variance
normally associated with a diversified portfolio. However,
few closed-end investment companies invest in every possible
type of company, and many have come to specialize in companies
of particular types. One such specialty is young, technically-
based firms.
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There are very few such investment companies which make
a routine business of supplying venture capital to new enterprises.
Of these, only three are large enough to be considered important,
and only one is active in the New England area. This one is Ameri-
can Research and Development Corporation, located in Boston. This
firm is a mature organization, has assets in excess of $31 million,
is listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and has well over 7,000
stockholders.
ARD is an aggressive organization, and it maintains a
substantial professional staff to appraise situations and to
follow the companies in its investment portfolio. Quoting from
a brochure of the firm,
"The objective of American Research and Development
Corporation is to help outstanding individuals
build companies of stature and to create capital
appreciation for the owners of these businesses
and for the ARD stockholders.
To achieve this goal, ARD:
. assists in creating companies based on the ideas
and new techniques of competent men
. invests in new companies
. invests in existing small or medium-sized
companies which appear to have growth potential.
.... The amount which ARD invests in a single situ-
ation is flexible and...is determined by the client's
requirements. In general, initial investments are in
the range of $50,000 to $1,000,000....
While ARD asserts that the creation and initial capitali-
zation of NRBE are among its goals, the ARD portfolio provides evi-
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dence that these are not major ones. ARD has discovered, as have
many other venture groups, that the risk and administrative costs
associated with initial financing of technological ventures off-
set the potentially great gain to be made from getting in very
early. While initial investments may in fact be "in the range of
$50,000 to $1,000,000," the million-dollar investment probably
doesn't cost much more to place and administer than the $50,000
one.
The risk associated with initial capitalization is
theoretically more severe for ARD than for its younger counter-
parts, the Small Business Investment Companies. For, although
they are in about the same business, the SBIC has, by the terms
of its charter, special tax protection which, at least in theory,
makes the extreme risk situation more tenable for it than for
the regular closed-end investment company.
For these reasons, ARD and other closed-end investment
organizations have played an exceedingly minor role in initial
venture capitalization. Yet, even if they were more favorably
disposed toward this type of situation, such organizations could
play only a very small role by virtue of their limited numbers
and resources.
The Small Business Investment Companies
The SBIC's were made possible by the Small Business In-
vestment Act of 1958 which, among other things, empowered the
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Small Business Administration to license private venture capital
companies. Such companies are empowered to extend loans and
equity capital to small enterprises which meet the following
criteria:
1. Assets not in excess of $5 million
2. Net worth not in excess of $2.5 million
3. After-tax average earnings for past two years
not in excess of $250,000.
4. Position in industry not dominant.
The SBIC is in concept a leverage organization. The
larger ones (investments in excess of $7 million) can borrow up
to 50% of capital and surplus but not exceeding $4 million from
the Small Business Administration. Beyond that they can borrow
from private sources up to the point where borrowings equal four
times capital and surplus. Thus, at least in theory, the SBIC
stockholder can have a debt-equity ratio of up to 4:1 at work for
him.
The SBIC's are also eligible for special tax treatment,
as indicated earlier. All dividends received by the SBIC from
portfolio companies are exempt from the usual corporate tax
rate (this is minor, however, since almost no new enterprise
can afford dividends). The SBIC's losses on sale of investments
may be deducted from ordinary income, rather than from capital
gains, for the purpose of computing taxes. Finally, the stock-
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holder in an SBIC also receives the benefit of asymmetric tax
treatment. If he sells his SBIC stock realizing a gain, he is
taxed at the capital gains rate (half the regular rate with
a ceiling at 25%); if he sustains a loss, it is deductible from
his ordinary income for tax xomputation.
For these reasons we would expect the attitude of the
SBIC's toward risky ventures, such as initial capitalization of
NRBE's, to be substantially more favorable than that of other
venture organizations. This does not appear to be the case,
however. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that, of the
three major classes of venture capital organizations, the SBIC's
may be the most cautious in their investment policies.
One reason for risk aversion among the SBIC's is their
typically small investment capacity. A recent study2 showed that,
of 1,565 SBIC's active in the U. S., as of 1962, only fifty-seven
had assets of $1 million or more - and of these, only twelve had
assets in excess of $7 million. Thus, risk aversion becomes a
principal goal for the vast majority of SBIC's. Venture in-
vestment results are governed by the laws of probability, but
for most SBIC's a single unfavorable outcome could spell
2 William H. Herrman, Small Business Investment Companies, an
unpublished report to Halle and Stieglitz, New York, 1963.
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A second reason for SBIC disinterest in new situations
is that many SBIC's have been organized in such a way as to take
advantage of the government credit guarantee, but to serve pur-
poses somewhat different from those intended by the legislation.
For example, officers of many banks, credit agencies, development
corporations and other groups have organized minor SBIC's to act
in capacities merely complementary to their main lines of business.
SBIC's of this class, with a few exceptions, would probably not
3 This is an important fact of general applicability to NRBE
initial financing, and deserves elaboration. Simply stated,
it boils down to this: even though the small business "game"
has the same expected value (rate of return) as the large
business "game", nonetheless, since the variance associated
with small business is greater than with large, a bigger stake
is required to play the small business game with the hope of
attaining the expected value.
As an example, let us take two roulette players, A and B.
Each begins with a stake of thirty dollars, betting five on
each spin of the wheel. A bets only that the number that
comes up will be an odd one, but B bets that it will be one
of the six numbers divisible by five. It is a no-house-gain
wheel, so both A and B have equal long-run expected gains:
zero. A has a very good chance of staying in the game all
evening and ending with his expected zero gain (his robability
of being ruined in the first six spins is only (1/2) = .0157.
B's chances are not quite so good - his probability of being
ruined on the first six spins, for example, is (4/5)6 = .25 -
or sixteen times that of A.
The relevance of this example will quickly be seen if for A
we substitute "blue-chip investor" and for B, "NRBE investor".
Each has about the same expected rate of return, but the
stakes needed to stay in each game long enough to attain it
are quite different'
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disaster. 3
even talk to the engineer attempting to start a company, and would
not have the professional staff to evaluate his proposal even if
they did. Even the larger, publicly-held SBIC's tend to shy
away from initial financing, for much the same reasons as the
closed-end investment companies: the high risk and the high
cost per dollar invested.
To every rule there are exceptions, however. A signifi-
cant exception in the New England area is Boston Capital Corporation,
one of the largest SBIC's in operation (assets - $21 million, in-
vestments - $10 million). This firm exhibits an active interest
in new ventures as well as established companies. Of its total
portfolio of twenty-seven companies, ten were new at the time of
investment, and represent 33.6% of the total assets invested and
committed.
Boston Capital appears to be one of the very few SBIC's
actually fulfilling in some degree the role invisioned for all of
them by Congress. Yet this is not the paradox that it might appear
to be, because BCC has the size required to support an expert app-
raisal staff, to diversify its investments, to invest in situations
of various levels of riskiness, and to survive the losses that are
to be expected in new venture financing.
Summarily, the SBIC's do not today represent a significant
source of initial capital for new technical enterprise in New Eng-
land or anywhere else. For the reasons mentioned earlier, there
is little indication that many of them will ever participate in
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such situations, although as the larger SBIC's mature one should
expect their participation to increase.
The Family Investment Organization
The organizations entrusted with the investment of major
portions of hereditary family fortunes are among the most impor-
tant individual suppliers of venture capital in the country.
While the majority of the family groups are not in the venture
capital business at all, the few that are exert a substantial
influence in the venture capital market.
Family investment groups are organized in a variety of
ways, some as partnerships, some as corporations, some involving
the family members collectively, some simply providing a community
investment staff for several individuals. In certain family in-
vestment groups, one or more members of the family will participate
rather actively in the selection and following of portfolio com-
panies. In others, the investment staff effectively has the
family's proxy to proceed in an independent manner. In certain
cases, the organization has allocated to it a certain fixed
amount to be invested in venture situations; in others, the
resources available are limited only by the merit of the pro-
jects coming to its attention.
It is the consensus of the financial community that, of
all venture capital organizations, the few best-known family
groups are probably the most sophisticated and capable venture
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capitalists to be found. It was the author's observation, after
some contact with certain of these groups, that there is evidence
to support this consensus. The family groups have several ad-
vantages, as compared to other forms of venture capital organi-
zations. They have no stockholders to answer to during "building
years." They normally have excellent professional staffs for the
appraisal and assistance of the new firms - often including men
of technical, as well as financial and managerial, backgrounds.
In addition, the family group frequently has resources available
for second and third financing of the portfolio company, and is
under no pressure to get out at the first opportunity. Unlike
the SBIC, the family investment group has no limitation on the size
and type of venture situation that can be backed, nor constraints
on the amount of its participation in a situation.
Yet, for all these advantages, the family groups also play
a very small role in initial financing of NRBE's. One reason may
be theirvery sophistication. The major groups have been organized
since World War II; in that period they have accumulated a fair
amount of experience with new company financing, much of it bad.
One observer, discussing the experience of J. H. Whitney and
Company, a family group once active in new ventures, commented as
follows:
"In a period of twelve years, J. H. Whitney and
Company screened 7,000 investment prospects, and
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chose fifty - less than 1% - as worthy in-
vestment risks."
"Its capital rose 400% in this twelve-year
period. But an ordinary stock portfolio
would have jumped 500% in value in that
time, including reinvestment of all divi-
dends, with far less trouble and expenses
and infinitely less risk."
"Moreover, five-sixths of the increase in
capital came from only five ventures. And
Whitney had to sink $2 million or more in
each of these five ventures! Actually even
this record of appreciation wouldn't have
been realized had it not been for one pre-
maturely early success of one firm."
"The picture looks even more gloomy when you
look at the record on investments under
$500,000.... Poor J. H. shelled out less
than $500,000 exactly thirty-eight times.
In fifteen cases, Whitney lost his shirt.
In six cases, he came out even - not counting
all the expenses. In four cases he made some-
thing, but the return was hardly worth the
effort. Only thirteen of the thirty-eight
firms brought in a decent return. For the
entire group of thirty-eight, the average
annual return was less than 2%. For the
thirteen successful investments, the annual
rate was 9 - 10%" 4
Another family investment group, Payson and Trask, has
translated its experiences with initial financing into a firm
operating policy:
4organizing, Investing, Borrowing: New Opportunities in Small Busi-
ness Investment Companies, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey, 1961. (quoted by Herrman)
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"The majority of the nearly thirty ventures
backed by Payson and Trask in the past eleven
years are small firms on the threshold of major
growth - but lacking capital to swing such
growth on their own. Such companies frequently
outrun their founders' resources before they
have matured to the point where they can win
support of individual or institutional investors."
"Payson and Trask usually will not attempt to pro-
mote new inventions. It prefers ventures that
have a record of profitable operations - or, at
least, seem to be approaching the break-even
point. It feels companies running into heavy
start-up expenses or market development costs
are out of its depth. Occasionally, though, it
has turned new investions (one example: a nylon
zipper) over to one of its money-making affili-
ates. The affiliate can plow its earnings into
commercializing the invention." 5
Thus, the experience in financing the very small and very
young organization was not a happy one for some family groups.
While a few extremely promising new situations till get financed
by the family groups, this number is minute in comparison to the
private individual investor's activity.
The Communications Function of Venture Capital Groups
It would be quite incorrect to infer from the foregoing
that the venture capital organizations play no constructive role
in the financing of new technical ventures. The correct con-
clusion is simply that they supply very little money. Their
5 "Small Business Gets a Break," Chemical and Engineering News,
Vol. 36, p. 36, October 20, 1958.
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real contribution to the entrepreneur searching for initial fi-
nancing is usually one of communication and referral to someone
who can help. Owing to their experience in venture capital,
their extensive contacts in the industrial and financial comm-
unities, and their daily interaction with the venture capital
market, these organizations perform an exceedingly effective
role as communications centers, bringing people with good ideas
in contact with people with the right kind of money. This function
is performed on an informal, person-to-person basis, typically at
no cost to either party.
With the exception of a number of SBIC's (noted earlier),
the officers of nearly any venture capital organization are
willing to spend some time with any aspiring entrepreneur with
a reasonable idea. They are likely to be very helpful, aiding
the applicant in the appraisal of his own idea, making suggestions
on financing arrangements, and likely referring him to a source
of venture capital more appropriate to his needs. At the very
least, they can provide the entrepreneur with an impartial pro-
fessional sounding-board, upon which he can test his proposal to
see how it is likely to be judged by the rest of the financial
community. Thus, it is probably worth his while for him to
approach one of these groups, even though he recognizes that
their policies exclude their participation in his venture.
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Chapter IV
THE AVAILABILITY OF INITIAL VENTURE CAPITAL
"In a dynamic growing economy, the needs of entre-
preneurs may exceed available capital resources.
At best, there will be an unsatisfield demand,
with all businesses - small, medium, and large,
competing for the investors' funds. Increasing
concentration of savings in the hands of insti-
tutions, investment trusts, and other similar
investors means that small business, more and
more, must meet recognized competitive standards
of performance, management, and growth potential
in order to raise new capital." 1
In this observation, Bernard Cahn comes close to the heart
of the question of "availability," yet runs aground on the concept
of "need." Demand is really the only conceptually tractable di-
mension in such a discussion, as the Federal Reserve System dis-
covered in their 1958 study of small business financing.2 They
discovered, to no one's very great surprise, that most small
businessmen and new entrepreneurs felt that they "needed" more
capital than was available to them. Such findings, which under-
lay in a large degree the Small Business Investment Act of 1958
and its legislative forbears, largely ignored the economic fact
1 Bernard D. Cahn,'apital for Small Business: Sources and Methods,"
Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, School of Law,
Duke University, 1959.
2 Federal Reserve System, Financing Small Business, A report to the
Committees on Banking and Currency and the Select Committees on
Small Business, U. S. Congress, 1958.
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that capital is by definition a scarce resource, and is allo-
cated to those who compete for it, in proportion to their ability
to stand the test of the market.
The demand for funds, on the other hand, is not an indi-
pendent variable either, as any investment banker will admit. De-
mand for equity venture funds, for example, can be very much a
function of the entrepreneur's perception of his liklihood of
success in his quest for them. Throughout the period 1959 - 1961,
when the scientific glamour stocks were selling at incredible multi-
ples of earnings and unseasoned public issues were being floated
daily, demand for equity funds appeared to be high. It was high,
not because funds were needed for growth and development in any
such quantity but because promoters saw that market conditions
made such funds available. The author was told by several inter-
view subjects however, that since the market shake-out of May
1962, there has been a remarkable decline in the number of pro-
posals coming to the attention of venture investors. Thus, any
argument concerning level of need, based on observations of market
"demand" at a given time, is subject to some suspicion.
The Supply
Among the investors interviewed, there was near unanimity
on the proposition that the aggregate supply of funds available
for all types of venture investments has never been greater., This
consensus is borne out in part by the large proportion of the SBIC
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funds which are still uncommitted after three or four years of
operation. As one investor put it,
"The real need is not for more venture money, but
for more really promising situations."
Behind this fairly typical statement lies the fact that, while
more money may be potentially available for growth situations than
ever before, the criteria for judging these situations are more
stringent than ever before. The experience of 1959 - 1961, which
another investor appropriately calls "the second era of glorious
nonsense," ended by driving most of the unsophisticated and
marginal investors completely out of the venture capital market -
and by making the professionals much more careful in their app-
raisal of NRBE's.
The departure of the amateurs from the venture capital
market has probably been more than offset, in terms of potential
supply, by the increasing number of industrial firms which are be-
coming venture capitalists, as discussed in Chapter II.
The standards by which new technical firms are judged
today, in terms of technical and managerial capability, market
potential, stage of product development, etc., appear to be more
stringent and probably more realistic than they have been for
several years. While a few guileless investors are probably
still betting on things with technological-sounding names, they
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are in a shrinking minority.
Thus, in the terms of the economist, while the absolute
quantity of potentially available capital may be as large as ever,
the supply curve has risen (i.e., the price, standardized for risk,
has risen for any quantity of capital supplied). The demand curve
has, if anything, fallen for reasons noted earlier. The net re-
sult is that the quantity of equity venture capital being supplied
today is probably smaller than at any time in the past five years.
The Terms of Availability
It is difficult to talk about the terms on which initial
venture capital is available to the entrepreneur without discussing
the appraisal process to which he is submitted by the venture capital
market. This is the subject of a later chapter, however, so we shall
limit discussion here to the terms on which equity capital is available
to the enterprise which has survived the selection process.
To the extent that initial venture capital is available at
all from the venture capital organizations, the entrepreneur is
likely to find that it is available only on rather stiff terms. This
is due in part to the factors mentioned in the previous chapter, and
in part to the fact that the motivation of most of these organi-
zations is essentially economic. Their terms are stiff in terms
of percent of equity demanded (one SBIC officer stated, "We want
fifty to sixty-five percent if we're putting up all the money on a
new business."). These organizations are also stringent in their
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demands in terms of corporate debt. The convertible debenture is
a common form of near-equity financing which provides the in-
vesting organization with the bargaining position of creditor,
but which requires interest payments of the new firm at exactly
the time when they can be least afforded.
The venture capital organizations frequently make deals
which include some measure of management intervention on their
part in the affairs of the company. There is a rather broad con-
tinuum of participation arrangements, ranging from the usual
directorship through compulsory "management consultant" contracts.
While a certain amount of management assistance is frequently needed
and welcomed by the entrepreneur, he will do well to recognize
that the amount of such intervention he may expect varies sub-
stantially from organization to organization.
The private individual investor is not only more likely
to supply initial risk funds than the venture capital organization,
but is likely to supply them on rather more liberal terms. He is
seldom interested, for example, in gaining a controlling fraction
of the company equity for his contribution, simply because he
cannot devote the time and energy to a situation that control
implies. Moreover, he is more likely to be betting on person-
alities than on technologies, and to feel that people who are
running their own show in their own best interest are more likely
to do a good job for him. For much the same reason, the management
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role demanded by the individual investor appears to be rather more
passive than that demanded by the venture capital groups. He is
usually satisfied with a directorship and with an opportunity to
help out if asked. (This obviously does not apply to individuals
investing in their own enterprises).
The private individual investor appeared to be much less
concerned with protection and guarantees than other venture capi-
tal sources. He usually prefers straight equity participation,
perhaps supplemented by options, to the more exotic forms such as
convertible debentures. It is fairly common, however, for a pri-
vate individual to loan subsequent funds to the company for which
he has provided the initial equity capital. The author was unable
to determine whether provision for such loans was normally made
in the initial financing agreement.
One reason for the sometimes very liberal terms on which
entrepreneurs have been able to obtain initiating funds is the tax
incentive offered to wealthy individuals by section 1244 of the
Internal Revenue Code. This provision, which was established in
the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, and which will be dis-
cussed in a later chapter, says in effect the following: Any
investor in a "1244 company" - one which is below specified limits
of size and net worth - can deduct any loss on stock sale from
ordinary income for the computation of taxes. Capital gains are
taxed at the usual rate, about 25%. This is in effect the identical
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Uincentive offered to investors in SBIC's. A wealthy individual
(tax bracket 75% plus) thus has very little to lose if the new
venture should fail. In effect, this often means not only that
funds are available on quite liberal terms, but sometimes even
that the company is neglected by the principal investor, to its
great detriment. In more than one instance of which the author
is aware, companies have actually been forced to liquidate simply
for reasons of tax expediency on the part of the principal in-
vestor. Thus, 1244 offerings occasionally provide a means for
obtaining initial capital on rather liberal terms, although
this is not always an unmixed blessing.
In summary, then, itis the opinion of the author and
most of those he interviewed that the total growth capital being
supplied today is less than in recent years, notwithstanding the
newer tax incentives. The terms on which this capital is being
supplied are more stringent than in recent years, as are the
criteria by which situations are being judged today. While
individual investors may be no less willing than ever to supply
initial venture capital, the disappearance of the venture groups
and the underwriters from this game has almost certainly brought
the total being supplied far below its 1960 - 1961 level.
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Part Two:
THE INVESTMENT DECISION
Chapter V
WHAT THE INVESTOR LOOKS FOR
"A venture-capital firm or an investment company
usually screens all phases of a company carefully
before it invests for its own account or recommends
the situation to others. This includes judgment as
to the character and capacity of the individuals in-
volved; their ability to adapt themselves to the
growth they claim as likely; an investigation of the
technological feasibility of the new product or pro-
cess, including costs; an evaluation of the potential
market for the product or process, including the
nature and the long-run future of the industry of
which the firm is a part; an examination of the firm's
past earnings and accounting records; and an investi-
gation into the relevant legal aspects such as those
regarding patents ....
On the other hand, it seemed to the interviewers that
wealthy individual investors, in contrast with the
larger funds, seemed to accept the judgment of friends
as to the opportunities inherent in a special situ-
ation. This casualness may be due to the difficulties
of investigation for any but specialists in such
matters." 1
My study confirms that the Federal Reserve report is basi-
cally correct in its characterization of the appraisal practices of
institutional investors' appraisal policies as being different from
those of individuals. It was the finding of the present survey how-
ever that while such a distinction tends to exist, there may be very
good reasons for its existence.
U. S. Federal Reserve System, Financing Small Business, A report to
the Committees on Banking and Currency and the Select Committees on
Small Business, U. S. Congress, 1958.
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The apparent "casualness" that attends the investment
decision of the private individual is not altogether irrational.
First, by virtue of the fact that he invests in many more initial
financing situations than the venture capital group, he necessarily
has different appraisal processes. Such situations do not usually
lend themselves to the careful appraisal of market potential, past
profits, etc., by which the institutions judge more mature com-
panies. Thus, he is thrown upon his ability to judge people, and
upon the judgment of his friends. Second, the typical wealthy
individual investor could, if he chose, retain professional coun-
sel in his choice of situations - but this to most would be like
hiring a professional golfer to play his game for him. Yet, in-
formal as this process is, there is little evidence to demonstrate
that the individual investor in risk situations fares any worse
than his sophisticated colleagues in the venture capital firms.
Bases for Evaluation
The People Involved
It was the almost unanimous consensus of the individuals
interviewed that people are the most important thing to look at
in a venture situation. As one subject put it,
"A first-rate man with a second-rate idea is a
much better bet than a second-rate man with a
first-rate idea."
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Another said,
"The only thing we're really trying to find
out is, What kind of guy is the president?"
Many of the individual investors I spoke with felt that
any major weakiness on the part of management could constitute
grounds for the rejection of a proposal, although two stated that,
should the company and the market appear to have sufficient promise,
they would sometimes help the initial group to find additional team
members with the necessary skills.
There were several interesting comments made on the compo-
sition of founding groups. One interview subject said that the
major thing to stay clear of is the situation where everybody thinks
he's president - where no single individual is strong enough to take
authority and responsibility for the entire enterprise. Another
felt that a crucial element in any new venture group is the "screaming,
leaping, wild-eyed nut" - that every new venture needs one such indi-
vidual, to prod and stimulate the other principals. It was conceded,
however, that there was usually a problem later in the firm's de-
velopment as to what to do with this individual.
Some typical comments on the characteristics of the founding
group were:
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"Never let an investor be president."
"Has he professional experience? What
do his customers think of him? How
much time has he spent in jail?"
The usual criterion for a group of entrepreneurs appeared
to be balance - the presence of both technical and managerial skills
in complementary proportions. It was frequently acknowledged in
the interviews, however, that it is extremely difficult to assess
these abilities, particularly among technically-oriented people
who have no business record. Thus, even the most sophisticated
investor is obliged in many instances to rely upon the judgment
of his friends and associates in the appraisal of the people who
will run the new company.
Concerning the distribution of responsibility among the
founders, one individual said this:
"The investor should insist that a
single person be made president of
the venture, and that he have final
responsibility for decisions and
results."
Characteristics of the Market
At least two of those interviewed place "growing market"
ahead of "good people" in their criterion-ordering. One stated
that he often attempted first to seek out a promising market,
then find the group with the most promising technical capability
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in the field, and offer to back them.
While such an approach is not usual, it does point up
the enormous significance attached to a growing market by the
majority of venture capitalists. This emphasis naturally makes
it difficult to find financing for ventures which depend upon
markets which do not yet exist, (e.g. a venture based upon a new
technology such as "whisker metallurgy," or perhaps a venture
propsed to sell to a market which is expected to start growing,
such as the manufacture of protein from marine algae). Almost
all investors seem to demand at least some substantive indication
of commercial promise in the fairly near future.
An interesting exception to the growing-market criterion,
but tending in the other direction, is that of Payson and Trask,
a New York venture group:
"Payson and Trask aims its sights not just at
growth industries; within any one area it is
primarily interested in small firms that seem
to have a definite competitive edge. This
may mean broad experience or unusual ability on
the part of company officials, advantageous
geographical location, strong patent position
or technical know-how, or any of a host of
other factors." 1
Thus, while there is a rather wide distribution of opinion
about the necessity of a growing market, most places it in a po-
"Small Business Gets a Break," Chemical and Engineering News, Vol. 36,
p. 36, October 20, 1958.
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sition of rather great significance.
The Technology
In the area of technology criteria, as nowhere else, do
the great differences in motivation and objectives among investors
begin to emerge clearly. There exists among investors a whole
spectrum of attitudes toward technology, ranging from that of the
investor who will invest only in exciting new technological de-
velopments, to that of the man who will invest in anything that
promises capital growth, and if it happens to be technological,
that's o.k. One investor said,
"It doesn't matter if you trade technologies
so long as you have good management. That
is the one transferrable item."
One family group which has emphasized the former view,
investing in initial as well as growth situations, is Rockefeller
Brothers. This group is noted throughout the financial community
not only for their excellent selection and followthrough, but also
for their firm commitment to new and developing technologies. One
member of the Boston financial community contrasted the Rockefeller
philosophy with his own in this way:
"I'm interested in exploiting established technical
developments, like transistors - not in capital-
izing research for new and future technologies
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like the Rockefellers. But it's their game,
they have the time and the money to play it,
and God bless 'em."
Yet operating at this end of the technology spectrum has
hazards, at least psychological ones, even for Rockefellers. A
recent report in Barrons stated,
"Possibly the biggest and probably the wealthiest
individual in speculative scientific ventures is
Laurence S. Rockefeller, In common with many
another holder of glamour stocks, Mr. Rockefeller
in the past two years has seen his commitments go
up and down like a yo-yo. Unlike most, however,
he has lost neither his fortune nor his head.
Nor, it might be added, his faith in the ulti-
mate rewards of investing in companies which
operate on the far-out frontiers of technology." 2
The sample of the investing public which was interviewed
in the present survey was selected in such a way that it was un-
doubtedly strongly biased toward the investor with a favorable
attitude toward new technologies. For this reason, most subjects
tended to emphasize the desirable aspects of investing in new
technology, while ignoring the disadvantages (e.g., long de-
velopment times, uncertainties of the research process, frequent
dependence on arbitrary government contracting agencies, and a
multitude of others). Yet, although these aspects did not receive
2 Peter C. DuBois, "Unshaken Confidence," Barrons, June 24, 1963,
p. 5.
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frequent mention, it would probably be incorrect to infer that
investors are not aware of them. It is rather the author's infer-
ence that these factors are simply accepted by the investor as
components of the risk which makes venture financing a venture.
There emerged several interesting criteria for the
selection of a technology in which to invest. We have already
noted the criterion of "frontier research" which guides the
Rockefellers. Another criterion is that of staying in a tech-
nology in which one already has some experience, either as an
investor or as an operator; thus, "specialists" tend to emerge
as known investors in particular fields. Several investors
mentioned that the technology in which they invested had to
have some promise of civilian (vs. space and military) appli-
cation before they were interested. It was also noted that
the technology involved should be of sufficient current inter-
est to attract government R and D contracts to support the firm
in its early years, although several individuals strongly dis-
puted this viewpoint. Their opinion was that government R and
D contracts, while they may help to build a research capability,
are frequently diversionary from the company's central inter-
ests and permit very little profit on an enormous expenditure
of energy, not just on research, but also on proposal and
report preparation.
The ultimate criterion for selecting a technology to
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back appeared to be its general excitement. A dramatic and
slightly mysterious technology still seems to have a good deal
of attraction even among sophisticated investors - although
not so much as a very few years ago. One investment counsellor
said,
"Let's face it - you've got to have technological
glamour to get one of these things financed at all."
For some investors, however, an exciting technology is almost
sufficient reason to invest. Either they are erstwhile tech-
nologists themselves and fascinated by science and engineering,
or they have a sort of mystical commitment to the fulfillment
of the ideas of technologists. The author can find no other
explanation for the terms and conditions under which some of
the NRBE's have been financed in the Boston area.
The Product
It is virtually impossible today to attract backing for
a technologist with nothing but an idea. Even among the most
sanguine and patient of investors there is today the insistence
that a substantial amount of product and/or process development
shall have been done already, at the expense of the entrepreneur
or someone else.
What constitutes an acceptable level of development to
attract financing seems to vary over a rather wide range. Several
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investors stated that the existence of a working prototype was
indication of sufficient development. Still others felt that
the product should be essentially ready for manufacture and mar-
keting. Two stated that they would not even consider a proposal
unless the first sale had already been made.
Thus, even for initial equity financing, it is frequently
necessary that a substantial investment shall have already been
made by the investor, if not in money, then at least in time and
energy. Thus, it would appear that the capital market is in
effect discriminating in favor of those products of relatively
low unit cost, which can be prototyped in the investor's garage
and which demand no exotic materials or processes. While this
does in fact seem to occur, there are other instances in which a
development is transplanted almost directly from a university
laboratory or from the laboratories of the firm which formerly
employed the entrepreneurs. Such a development may be quite the
opposite of the inventor's garage-produced brainchild; it may
have high unit cost, employ exotic techniques, and require a lot
of money to develop and sell. Thus, the capital market is not
filtering off such innovations by its insistance on prior de-
velopment effort - but it is limiting rather firmly the conditions
under which different sorts of development can occur.
The insistence upon prior development work has some of
its roots in a number of unhappy investor experiences. In a
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typical one, an engineer approached a venture capital group with
a device which was "almost ready for market," asking for $200,000
for working capital and marketing expenses. Today, four years and
$350,000 later, the company again is out of money, the device is
still "almost ready for market," and the first sale is yet to be
made. More than once the author encountered the opinion that
engineers had to be watched very carefully, or growth capital
would be dissipated either on refining existing products or on
developing new ones before existing products had begun to pay off.
Size of Investment
The author began this study expecting to find some lower
limit on the size of investment which investors would consider
worthwhile. He could find no evidence, however, that such a
lower limit exists. While many investors do in fact have such
a "minimum economic investment," the range is enormous. Several
investors were encountered who had put $1,000 to $2,000 initial
capital into tiny new companies. At the other end of the spectrum,
one group asserted that they considered no investment under $1
million, although the author doubts that the policy applies to many
initial venture situations.
While no statistics are available to the author on this
question, it appeared to him that the greatest fraction of all
initial capitalization of NRBE's - perhaps as much as 75% - falls
between $50,000 and $200,000.
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In summary, it may be risky to try to typify a single ideal
company - and it is certainly impossible to find any ideal to which
all investors would subscribe. However, if the following situ-
ation were available for initial capitalization, a great many indi-
vidual and institutional investors would be interested.
People:
Market:
Technology:
Product:
Investment needed:
a proven team of technical, manufacturing and
sales people, who had worked together for some
years, and all of whom had business experience
in some form.
a large and rapidly-growing market, with some
prospect of a consumer component ultimately
developing.
an exciting, relatively new field, but one
which had already demonstrated somehow its
market potential and its potential for sup-
porting a stream of realted products.
a competent application of the state-of-the-
art technology, developed nearly to the point
of possible market exploitation.
less than $500,000, and preferably no more than
$200,000 if it must come from a single source.
These, then, are attributes that a private investor might
look for. How he identifies them in a particular situation and how
they are weighted by him are subjects of a later chapter.
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Chapter VI
IDENTIFYING INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES
"The fraternity of individual backers of small
business appears to be rather close knit, at least
on a local level. A good deal of information is
passed about by word of mouth. If one investor,
who enjoys considerable prestige among his associ-
ates, believes a situation to be promising and
recommends it to others, his friends may par-
ticipate, merely on the basis of his recommen-
dations." 1
If this statement is true for small business in general,
it applies with even greater force to the initial financing of
NRBE's. And if any single fact emerged clearly from thisstudy,
it is that communications about venture opportunities within
the financial community of Boston-New York are very good - much
better than is often supposed.
Professor Rubinstein, in his 1958 study of technical
entrepreneurship in the Boston area,2 concluded that the channels
of communication between investors and entrepreneurs were quite
poor, and recommended the establishment of a central service or
U. S. Federal Reserve System, Financing Small Business, report to
Congress, 1958.
2 Albert H. Rubinstein, Problems of Financing and Managing New
Research-Based Enterprises in New England, a research report to
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1958.
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clearing-house to bring investors and ideas together. It is the
present author's opinion, however, that at least today very few
ventures of any merit escape the attention of the major venture
capital sources. A clearing-house of some sort might improve the
situation but only very slightly, since essentially this function
is being performed today by investment banking houses, commercial
banks, lawyers, and as mentioned earlier, venture capital firms.
Indeed, it appeared at times to the author that a group with a
promising innovation would require some security measures if it
did not wish to be known throughout the financial community.
A typical pattern of referral might operate as follows.
The hopeful entrepreneur, about to start selling his device, goes
to his bank to request a short-term business loan. The banker
explains that he cannot make such a loan without security, and
that what the entrepreneur needs is equity capital. The banker
then refers him to two or three local venture capital organi-
zations. Each of these, in turn, listens patiently and then
explains that initial venture capitalization is too risky for
them, but that they know some private people who might be inter-
ested. The search for backing begins to diverge very rapidly,
and it is only a short time until the entrepreneur has either
received an indication of interest, or has been rejected by
the capital market for reasons which he now understands.
This basic pattern has innumerable variations; it may
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start or end at entirely different points in the capital market.
In one instance a group of entrepreneurs with a promising device
went first to a private individual, a partner in an investment-
banking house. He referred them to an SBIC which ultimately fi-
nanced them. In another, an entrepreneur went to a private in-
vestor, was referred to a bank which, in turn, sent him to
another private investor who was interested.
The reason why this process succeeds at all is that the
knowledgable investors appear to stay in quite close contact with
the financial community (if, indeed, they are not already employed
in it). Investors, bankers, investment bankers, investment counsell-
ors, and lawyers tend to form a community of interest and an associ-
ation to which more than one interview subject referred as "the
club." Communication is informal, fast, and remarkably effective.
The 'Finder"
Anyone who calls himself a "finder" is subject to a con-
siderable burden of suspicion from the financial community today,
and for this reason finders seldom call themselves finders any-
more, nor their fees, "finder's fees."
The traditional and legitimate role of the finder in the
capital market has been that of an individual who, through his
wide associations and personal efforts, is able to take a venture
situation, interest appropriate investors in it, and negotiate
acceptable terms on both sides. This "middleman" service has
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typically commanded a fee of from five to ten percent of the
total amount negotiated. In recent years, however, this fee
has been demanded by "finders" of various shadings of legitimacy,
and whose actual contributions to the financing of the enterprise
may have been quite negligible. One investor interviewed cited
instances of "finders" who, ex post, had demanded fees simply
for giving the aspirant entrepreneur a list of people to go
see, or for introducing him to someone who ultimately supplied
some capital.
One of the problems of dealing with finders was illus-
trated by an SBIC officer who had himself once been finder:
"Sometimes when you're hungry you tend to
overlook some pretty obvious faults in
management, just to get your commission.
Being a commissioned leg-man is a tough
way to make a living."
The legitimate finder is still in operation both in
Boston and New York, but his practice has been much abridged by
the competing process of gratuitous referral from banks, venture
capital groups, etc. The entrepreneur, in establishing a re-
lationship with a finder, should insist on a clear understanding
of what will be the contributions of each party. He should also
expect to bear the finder's fee himself, either from his personal
resources or in management stock in the new company, since few in-
vestors are enthusiastic about investing in finder's fees.
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The Investor's Search Process
In addition to the somewhat passive majority of the in-
vesting individuals, there is a more active minority who do ex-
pend substantial effort in seeking out new venture situations.
These are often among the most successful NRBE backers, perhaps
because they have reasoned correctly that the best ventures have
usually been picked up before the informal referral system reaches
them. One investor, a man who had been investing in new enter-
prises since before World War I, felt that he got as much fun out
of "scouting around" as from his investments. Others reported
making efforts to keep aware of individuals and groups breaking
off from companies and unversities, as potential investment.
It was the author's impression, based on the most inadequate
data, that the individual investors engaged in such active
efforts tended to be those motivated largely by noneconomic ob-
jectives.
There are also a few venture capital organizations which
do not rely entirely upon the referral chain - who feel that, while
they see innumerable unsolicited proposals for financing, the
quality of the selection would be improved by some aggressive
leg-work. One SBIC officer put it this way:
"Ideas come in to us from the street, from
referrals, from investment bankers, and from
everywhere else. But this is all wrong. We
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ought to be out beating the bushes in the
fields we want to be in. We ought to be
on the offensive in looking for situations."
But being on the offensive is not cheap. An officer of
another venture capital group, to see if his costs of search were
in line, conducted an informal survey of his colleagues. His
conclusion: it costs $3,500 - $4,000 for a venture group to
ferret out and examine a single company. It is easy to see why
other firms have been tempted to maintain a passive role in
identifying new situations - especially if this process has given
passable results. It would be reasonable to assume that the ven-
ture capital organization, especially the publicly-held one, would
consider initiating an active search process when the quality
level of investment projects coming to its attention fell below
a certain point. This does not appear to be substantiated in
experience, however, since many of the somewhat passive SBIC's,
after three or four years of operation, are still far from being
fully committed.
The topic of advertising for projects arose only twice
in the course of the survey - but each time by the champion of
an extreme position. The first said,
"Situations don't come looking for you unless
someone knows you're alive. So it pays to
advertise a little - write an occasional
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magazine article, and so forth."
However, the other subject admonished,
"Whatever you do, don't advertise - you
get all the ."
The author was unable to abstract from these data a consensus of
the financial community on the topic of advertising.
In summary, while a number of individual and institutional
investors have chosen to search aggressively for promising situ-
ations, many more have not, and have given little indication of
ever doing so. Yet, this fact does not really imply irrationality
on the part of most investors - more typically, it means that the
selection of projects coming to their attention is already ade-
quate, or that the energy which search would require is better
spent on more conventional investments.
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Chapter VII
THE ESTIMATION OF RISK
"Are these drilling decisions completely ad hoc?
Or are they intuitively wise "calculated risks"?
What kinds of guides do operators use in forming
expectations about the wide range of possible
future outcomes? How do they measure risk? And
what yardstick do they use to select a course of
action? Payout? Return on investment? Hunch?
Most of the information in this area has come
from fiction, gossip, and legend." 1
The risks of which Grayson speaks are similar in many re-
spects to the risks confronting the backer of a new enterprise.
While the former are risks associated with unknown geological for-
mations which might or might not bear some amount of oil, the NRBE
investor is confronted by a host of uncertainties: unpredictable
markets, unfoseeable technical setbacks, unknown activity of com-
petitors, and above all, the unknowable human factors of the indi-
viduals he's backing. It is the purpose of this chapter to ex-
plore the ways in which the investor conceptualizes risk, the
standards by which he hedges against it, and the ways in which
those standards are usually applied.
C. Jackson Grayson, Jr., Decisions Under Uncertainty - Drilling
Decisions by Gas and Oil Operators, Division of Research, Graduate
School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1960.
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The Conceptualization of Risk
The behavior of risk-takers is a topic which has begun
to absorb the energies of some of our most capable researchers
in economics, management, and the social sciences. It is a topic
of enormous significance because, in the final analysis, the ten-
dency of individuals to take risks determines not simply how much
gets invested in NRBE's and oil wells, but in nearly every econ-
omic pursuit known to society. The ability to measure, to pre-
dict, and to supplement these risk-taking practices is an under-
standable pre-occupation of our academicians.
The conceptualization of risk by risk-takers has for
some time been a topic of some speculation. Just how does the
venture investor, for example, view the risk situation that con-
fronts him? And what is the significance of that view to him,
once adopted? There have been several theories, or "models",
of investors' risk conceptualization advanced. Some attempt to
describe how he does act; others, how he ought to act if he were
"rational."
Parenthetically, the definition of the work "risk" it-
self is rather elusive. Some writers have made it even more so
by defining "risk" to mean "insurable risk", and "uncertainty"
to mean "uninsurable risk", each definition implying a different
knowledge of the probabilities governing the process. Of course,
this is an artificial distinction since no future event is com-
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pletely insurable or completely uninsurable in terms of what's
known from experience. For the purpose of this discussion, then,
no such distinction will be made, and we shall adopt the definition
of risk advanced by Professors Cootner and Holland: "We think it
captures the essence of the problem to define situations as risky
wherever there is the possibility of an outcome different from
the expected one." 2
We might now briefly list a few of the most obvious
models of risk-takers, as follows:
1. The risk-taker considers only the liklihood of the
best possible outcome - i.e., his action is based
on an estimate of the skewness, or third moment,
of the probability distribution of possible out-
comes, rather than on a consideration of that
distribution as a whole.
2. He considers only the probability of the worst
possible outcome (e.g., complete loss) - again,
his concern is with only one characteristic of the
probability distribution, its third moment.
3. He asks, "What is the most likely outcome?" - i.e.,
he is concerned with the mean or first moment of
the distribution.
2 Paul H. Cootner and Daniel M. Holland, Risk and Rate of Return,
an unpublished research report, Division of Sponsored Research,
M.I.T. School of Industrial Management, 1963.
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4. He asks, "How likely is the most likely outcome?" -
i.e., he is concerned with the variance (second
moment) or kurtosis (fourth moment) of the distri-
bution.
5. He considers the probability of each of several
intermediate outcomes of varying degrees of success -
i.e., he is concerned with the entire shape of the
distribution confronting him.
While these models are all expressed in probabilistic terms, it does
not necessarily follow that the risk-taker should view them that way.
And the fact that he does not view risk mathematically certainly does
not make his expectations the less probabilistic. I expected at the
outset of this study not only to find evidence to support one or more
of the models of risk-taking behavior, but also to find some evi-
dence of a fairly well-developed (though not necessarily mathematical)
consciousness of probability.
Professor Rubinstein,3 after asking the question "How does
an investor in a NRBE calculate the risks?", answered in effect, "He
doesn't, because it's not possible to calculate them - and more-
over, it wouldn't be useful for most investors to calculate proba-
bilities, since they wouldn't invest in enough situations to give
probability a chance to work, anyway."
Albert H. Rubinstein, Problems of Financing and Managing New Research-
Based Enterprises in New England, a research report to the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Boston, 1958.
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The present survey suggests that Rubinstein was correct in
asserting that numerical probabilities do not get "calculated" by
most investors - but that he may have asked the wrong question.
While one or two of the men interviewed did discuss success in
such terms as a "one-in-ten deal," many more appeared to have merely
some fairly well-developed expectations (or "subjective probabilities")
in terms of which they judge risk. Thus, the proper question to have
asked may have been simply, "Do investors make some rational estimate
of risk and probability?" The answer seems to be yes.
It appeared to the author that the most widespread index for
risk estimation among NRBE investors is based upon an estimate of the
maximum payoff possible, together with a highly subjective estimate
of its probability of occurring. This is very similar to the first
model proposed. A typical response to an inquiry on risk was:
"Risk? Well, I just ask myself, 'What will be the
sales of this outfit X years from now?' and 'How
much would a company with this much sales be worth?'
and 'How much would my share of it be worth?' That's
how I look at it."
This was not an unusual sort of reply. The investor was not ex-
plicitly estimating risk, but possible payoff. Yet the very fact
that he acts on such an estimate obliges us to assume that to this
estimate of payoff he attaches some subjective probability of
attaining it. We can either assume that he considers this payoff
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an absolute certainty - or that he has some highly probabilistic
expectations about it. Moreover, if we assume the existence of
such subjective probabilities, it is reasonable to think that it
might even be possible to measure them, drawing inferences from
the investor's past behavior, his decisions, and his success rec-
ord. The task of identifying and measuring these subjective
probabilities, however, is one better left to advanced students
of behavioral science (see references in appendix).
Modern decision theory provides still another way of
viewing risk-taking which the author thought might be useful in
the present instance. It is called the "theory of utility" and
says, in effect, that people are not motivated simply by the
amount of the potential material gains, but rather, by the amount
of satisfaction or utility that will ensue from its possession.
More specifically, it means that making another thousand dollars
may not be so important to the investor as making the previous
thousand was (or maybe it's more important, depending on the indi-
vidual). Professor Grayson, in his study of drilling decisions
in the oil fields, contributed both a way of conceptualizing such
utility relationships and a potentially valuable technique for
measuring them empirically.
The former consists in plotting "utility" against dollars
C. Jackson Grayson, Jr., op. cit.
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gained and lost (Grayson calls this a "utility function"). As an
example, Figure 1 could represent an average individual's utility
function. "utiles"
3
2
1 -
$1,000
loss -30 -20
-3 -
10 20 30 $1,000
gain
Figure 1
Note first that it is not necessary to define the units of utility.
We can simply call them "utiles." Next, not that a much higher
utility is attached to the gain of the first $10,000 than to the
second, and that the utility of the third is small er still; but
a very great disutility is attached to a loss of even one or two
thousand dollars - i.e., the individual whose utility function is
depicted is a conservative risk averter.
Figure 2 depicts another sort of utility function, one
that might belong to one type of risk taker.
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"utiles"
3
2
1
t__ _ _ - ~ I I 1$1,000
loss -30 -20 10 20 30 gain
-1 -
-2 -
-3 -
Figure 2
Note how this curve differs from that of the risk-investor's
depicted in Figure 1. The possibility of small gains does not have
as much utility for him as that of a much larger gain, even though
the probability of attaining the larger gain may be less. Moreover,
he is not too concerned with possible losses, until the size of the
loss becomes rather large.
The value of such utility function plots is that it pro-
vides a way of conceptualizing different attitudes toward risk. If
it were possible to plot and compare curves for, say, samples of
individual investors, family fund managers, and SBIC officers, we
might have a basis for predicting how much interest should be
expected from each type in any particular venture proposal. Its
principal value is academic and theoretical, however, because of
the difficulties of plotting such curves empirically.
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Grayson's approach to measuring empirically the utility
functions of individuals was based on personal interviews. He
would confront his subject with a series of hypothetical investments
or "deals", with specified potential gains and losses. He would
then attempt to get the subject to state the probability of gain/
loss at which he was just indifferent.5 After determining the
indifference probabilities for several deals, Grayson was then
able to relate those for which the indifference probabilities
were equal and then plot gains/losses with their corresponding
"utilities." Obviously, it takes a great many such deals to pro-
duce a smooth curve, but Grayson appears to have had some ex-
ceptionally indulgent interview subjects, because his data are
quite extensive.
One of the goals of the present study was to determine
whether it might be possible to plot the utility function of the
NRBE risk-taker, as Grayson did for the oil operator. I was less
interested in actually gathering data and plotting curves than in
simply determining whether this would be possible. Thus a "deal"
of the Grayson type was devised (see Interview Format in appendix)
to test the reaction of the men interviewed.
5 A typical deal: "You have an opportunity to invest $10,000 in an
oil well. If it hits, you are certain to make $100,000; if it
doesn't, you lose your $10,000. Would you invest if the probability
of success were one in ten? If not, then two in ten? - etc.
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It was clearly apparent after two or three trials with
the hypothetical "deal" that this approach to measuring utility
among venture investors is not feasible. The reason is clear
enough: the required response to the Grayson-type deal is ex-
pressed in numerical probabilities but, as discussed earlier,
NRBE investors do not conceptualize probability numerically.
Thus, while an interview subject might respond that he would take
the deal at three chances in ten, he would not in a real situation
view the problem in this way. Parenthetically, the oil drilling
industry is one of the very few business situations in which
risks are normally viewed in terms of mathematical probability -
very careful analysis goes into the computation of probabilities
of the presence and amount of oil. Thus, oil drilling and gambling
appear to be the two most promising areas of application of Grayson's
technique. This does not make his contribution the less impressive,
however.
Hedging Against Risk
However the investor conceptualizes risk, it is clear that
he recognizes both that it exists, and that his best defense is to
minimize it through the application of standards to investment pro-
proposals - standards which, hopefully, eliminate at least some of
the unnecessary risk from venture situations, while preserving the
great potential gains inherent in them.
We touched on a few of these standards in Chapter V in
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describing the things investors look for in new ventures, and what
an "ideal" venture might look like. But since the ideal situ-
ation seldom occurs in nature, and since venture situations are
continually being financed, the relevant question to the investor
is "How ideal?".
To many investors, an extremely important standard is the
rate-of-return among comparable or similar companies, or companies
with products similar to those in question. This, in turn, re-
quires the existence of similar firms or products with which to
compare; thus, this standard discriminates against the not in-
frequent situation of a new device or technology without precedent,
making this a difficult type of venture to get financed. The
"industry rate-of-return" by which the investor judges the pro-
posal varies widely from individual to individual. A typical
figure given was fifteen to twenty percent annual return to in-
vestors. Anything below ten is not usually considered good.
A second standard for judging the venture appears to be
the length of time during which the entrepreneurial group has been
in existence and working together. Several investors mentioned
that, while they would consider initial capitalization of a NRBE,
it needed to have been together for some minimum period, which
ranged from six months to two years. They felt that such a
standard eliminated many of the risks associated with groups
that turn out to be incompatible.
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Yet another standard requires the existence, in the in-
vestor's opinion, of a potential product market of a specified
size (say, $5 million per year). How he goes about estimating
this is a highly individual matter, and ranges from professional
market analysis to crystal-gazing, as will be discussed presently.
Whatever the method of estimation, however, the standard is quite
important, at least to the extent that investors rely upon it.
A fourth group of standards centers about questions of
liquidity. How soon will there be a market for the stock? and
When can I expect the venture to go public? are typical questions
asked by the investor who employs liquidity criteria.
The other standards by which the investors feel they
hedge against risk are almost beyond enumeration. Many of them
are irrational, or represent a strong reaction against a previous
investment experience (e.g., "Don't invest in anything to do with
microwaves," or "Don't invest in a company with an engineer for
a president.") Nonetheless, such standards exist, are usually
clearly defined, and have great importance for both the investor
and the entrepreneur, to the extent that the investor perceives
these standards as his principal defense against risk and uncertainty.
Investigating the Venture
The attempt to apply standards to a company requires that
you know something about it. But the amount known about a venture
by its backers is a parameter ranging from about zero to 100 percent.
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Among venture capital groups in particular, the process
of company investigation has evolved into a highly-developed art.
The process of investigation in publicly- and privately-held
venture capital organizations are very similar. Typically, three
levels of screening exist through which a proposal must pass be-
fore it is considered for investment. For convenience of dis-
cussion, we shall call these stages initial, secondary, and
final screening.
Much of the initial screening of projects by the venture
organizations is done on a highly informal basis. A few minutes
spent reading a prospectus, or a brief telephone conversation
is all that is required to disqualify eighty to ninety percent
of the ventures that come before these groups. While an officer
of the group is usually able to identify one or more significant
weaknesses in the proposal before rejecting it, one SBIC officer
confessed that he was afraid that such factors as elegant pros-
pectus presentation, or the lack of it, sometimes had an undue
influence on the initial screening process. Thus, while there
are probably some deserving projects which get rejected by this
initial screening, it appears to be on the whole an effective and
efficient process.
The real scrutiny begins with secondary screening. This
process is initiated in some of the publicly-held venture groups
by giving the applicant group an extensive set of questionnaires
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to be completed. Such forms may be nearly exhaustive in their
coverage of every aspect of the technology, the product, the
market, the fiscal history of the enterprise, and the personal
histories of the principals. This information is typically then
verified and supplemented by conversations with the group's legal
counsel and auditors, its suppliers, its customers, its dealers,
its competitors and their customers, present and former associates
and employers of the principals, etc. In short, the secondary
screening encompasses nearly any means which can produce usable
information in a rather short time-span.
Perhaps twenty-five to fifty percent of the ventures
that begin it survive secondary screening; these are then sub-
jected to the typically longer process of final screening. The
usual reason given for the delay, which may be six to twelve weeks,
is to conduct a "market survey" - a survey which may or may not
occur in fact. The real reason for the delay appears to be to
give the investor group an opportunity to watch management per-
form under a variety of circumstances, and also to see whether the
group is capable of making a decent quarterly sales projection
(they submitted this during secondary screening). Thus, the
venture group gives the entrepreneurs a chance to prove what they
said.
In commenting upon this entire process, one interview
subject said that in his opinion the venture groups, especially
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the SBIC's, were far too cautious, too afraid of letting a good
venture get by. He felt that if SBIC's were bolder in the initial
screening, eliminating all doubtful proposals, they could concen-
trate more energy on the final screening process with an overall
improvement in portfolio quality. The author tends to agree with
this viewpoint, although one wonders whether the increased quality
would be purchased at the price of a still smaller portfolio for
the typical SBIC.
While the venture capital organization normally conducts
a very vigorous and professional investigation before making a
commitment, private investors are not generally inclined to go to
those lengths. Moreover, it would be reasonable to expect that
the investors with the least to lose in a venture (i.e., the
"1244 investors") would exert the least effort in the appraisal
of their investment situations; the study found evidence to support
this view.
The private investor appears to rely very heavily on his
contacts in business and technical areas in assessing the pros-
pects of a technology, a market, or a group of entrepreneurs. In
appraisal of potential markets, he will occasionally enlist the
aid of a professional consulting group to do a limited study; he
is more likely simply to ask his friends what they think of the
prospects, or who they know that might be able to judge. The
judgment of a technology is also difficult for the private indi-
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vidual, especially if he is not himself technically trained. One
senior investor of substantial technical experience stated that
he had withdrawn from NRBE financing in the past few years be-
cause he no longer had a basis for judging the importance of
new technical developments.
It should be added that there is an interesting and
sometimes humorous current of irrationality that runs through
the investment policies of many individuals. One senior in-
vestor described a selection in which he had participated in the
following terms:
"Our appraisal was the most unscientific thing
you can conceive of. We 'dreamed up' that we
were going to make money."
A banker expressed his view of most individuals' investment
policies as follows:
"If he gets out of bed on the right side in
the morning, he does it."
Most of the energy of the private individual in investi-
gating a situation is likely to be devoted to getting to know the
management. This often means getting to know them fairly well on
a personal basis, as well as through references, credit reports,
business records, etc. Personalities, more than any other factor,
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tend to determine the destiny of the NRBE's financing effort. The
enterprise that meets every one of an investor's "standards" will
probably be rejected if the investor doesn't like the president.
The inverse is also true: if the investor likes the entrepreneur,
financing may be arranged for situations which fall short of the
investor's standards - a fact often regretted later by the in-
vestor.
In summary, it appeared to the author that most investors
have a strong sense of risk, but that it is reflected primarily in
their practices designed to avoid it in unnecessary quantities.
Such practices normally center about the investigation of the
enterprise in more or less depth, so that some set of highly indi-
vidual standards may be applied to the situation.
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Chapter VIII
THE ROLE OF TAXES
"The tax structure, as of 1949, cut substantially
into the investment capacity of the upper income
and wealth classes - the strategic source of
venture capital for investment in business - and
on balance, it also decreased the willingness of
these investors in the aggregate to make equity-
type investments. In other words, for equity-type
investments considered as a whole the investors
who were induced by taxes to shift to less risky
investment positions appear to have over-balanced
the opposite reaction of appreciation-minded in-
vestors. The latter group, however, may have
been so stimulate'd by the tax structure to seek
out new investments offering unusually large
capital gains potentialities, such as promising
new ventures, as actually to increase the flow
of capital to such situations." 1
This early study of taxation's effects, while it gave
little emphasis to the initial capitalization problem, focused
clearly on a central issue: federal income taxes influence not
only the willingness of investors to enter risk situations, but
also their ability to do it.
The Capacity to Invest
It is reasoned,perhaps correctly, that the federal income
tax, by abridging the ability of wealth to multiply itself, has
dried up much of the capital which would otherwise have financed
J. Keith Butters, L. E. Thompson and L. L. Bollinger, Effects of
Taxation-Investments by Individuals, Division of Research, Graduate
School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1953.
new enterprises. While this is a reasonable and often-asserted
proposition, the present study found very little evidence to support
it. In fact, in all the discussions with investors, only once was
the effect of taxes mentioned as reducing the potentially available
total of venture capital. The author has no doubt that, had he
directly asked each investor, "Has the federal tax had an un-
desirable effect on your capacity to invest?", the answer would
likely have been an emphatic "yes", perhaps accompanied by a dis-
course on the baneful effects of the existing tax structure. How-
ever, no such question was asked during any of the many discussions
of tax questions, and the lack of any spontaneous mention of this
effect is in itself significant in the author's view. An expla-
nation of this apparent de-emphasis since the 1949 Butters et al
study may be that the wealthy individual has simply gotten used
to the high progressive income tax, as time dims the recollection
of the days when it wasn't so high. Or, perhaps the federal income
tax structure, oppressive though it may appear to high-income indi-
viduals, is provided with enough "safety-valves" (e.g. capital gains
provisions, tax-free securities, depletion allowances, and special
treatments for business losses) as to keep the pressure from be-
coming altogether intolerable. Whatever the reason, it appears
to the author that, while taxes may in fact be limiting the
venture capital available, investor awareness of this fact is not
a significant component of the conscious investment decision.
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An earlier study by Butters and Lintner, conducted during
World War II, suggested that the supply-effect of the personal
income tax had a rather different influence on the formation of
new enterprises. They concluded that the federal income tax was
most important in that it reduced the disposable incomes of the
potential entrepreneurs to such a level that they could not start
a new business with their own resources. While this is an inter-
esting academic argument, it would be an extremely difficult one
to test empirically'. It would be rather difficult to identify a
sample of individuals who would have started new companies but for
their tax-limited resources; it would be harder still to identify
a sample who might have started new businesses, had greater per-
sonal affluence suggested such a course to them. Butters and
Lintner admit that this is at best a minor component in the de-
cision to initiate a new company, and that taxes in general play
an almost negligible role in this stage of new enterprise for-
mation.
In general, discussions of the income-limiting effects
of taxes on venture capitalization are interesting but inde-
terminate, since even the investor (let alone the academician)
has little idea of what he would have done with money he never had.
2
J. Keith Butters and John Lintner, Effect of Federal Taxes on
Growing Enterprises, Division of Research, Graduate School of
Business Administration, Harvard University, 1945.
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The principal consequence of tax limitations on investor capacity
is indirect in its effect on investment decisions. Briefly stated,
it is that tax limitation probably create a reaction of demand for
additional "safety-valve" features of the type discussed earlier.
Once gained, such ameliorations of the tax burden may themselves
exert a strong influence on the investment decisions of indi-
viduals, as will be discussed in the next few paragraphs.
The Willingness to Invest
We turn now to the central issue of the tax discussion,
which is whether, and in what ways, the Internal Revenue Code
has influenced investors' willingness to back venture enterprises.
Any discussion of "willingness" however, leads us back to our
earlier discussion of investor motivation, and the polarity
we represented as economic motivation vs. non-economic motivation.
It appeared to the author during the course of the survey that the
investors of basically economic motivations tend to be most influ-
enced by the tax considerations of a situation. The non-economic
investor, almost by definition, would probably back new enter-
prises no matter what tax structure confronted him. Thus, most
of what follows applies mainly to the economically-motivated in-
vestor.
Without question, the greatest tax impetus to new enter-
prise investment is the possibility of obtaining long-term capital
gains, taxable at a maximum rate of twenty-five percent. While,
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Uagain, it is impossible to tell how investors might react to some
other tax structure, it is clear to the author that under the
present one, the investor puts capital gains in a position of
paramount importance. It was mentioned or implied as being
extremely important by virtually every investor subject. As an
attempt to gain some measure of "how important?", the author
asked a few subjects how they might react to hypothetical changes
in the tax structure (e.g., maximum income tax - seventy-five per-
cent, maximum capital gains tax - fifty percent). The answers
were rather inconclusive, however - due probably to the fact that
the possibility suggested had never been considered by the subject.
While this small experiment in measuring the importance of capi-
tal gains failed, the survey nonetheless showed that its im-
portance is probably greater than any other single economic factor.
The "Small Business Investment Act of 1958," in addition
to creating the SBIC's, established a special tax incentive for
backers of a particular class of new enterprise. This class is
called the "1244 Companies," after Section 1244 of the Internal
Revenue Code, which specifies the tax treatment. Such a company
a) Must not offer over $500,000 in common stock
in the 1244 issue.
b) Must not have aggregate capital exceeding $1,000,000
including the issue.
Any individual investor in such an issue may take as an ordinary
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loss attributable to his trade or business a loss resulting from
such an investment; the maximum such loss allowable in a single
year is $25,000, or $50,000 on a joint return. Capital gains on
stock sale are treated in the usual way. Thus, an investor in
the ninety percent tax bracket can keep seventy-five cents of
every dollar gained, but loses only ten cents on every dollar
lost by the venture.
This tax incentive is very well known in the financial
community; only one of the subjects interviewed seemed unaware
of its existence. About half the private investors in the
sample had, at one time or another, participated in 1244 offerings,
although opinions differ on the importance of this provision as an
incentive to investment. Only one investor indicated that since
they had almost nothing to lose he and his partners invested in
only small businesses making 1244 offerings. The consensus seemed
to be that 1244 was a rather marginal "sweetner" however - and
that few people, especially today, are tempted to invest because
of this alone.
One objection to 1244-type loss-hedges was expressed by
an investor who had himself been an entrepreneur:
"Maybe 1244 helps attract some money, but at the
same time it puts all the investors' attention on
the possibility of losses and failure. You've got
to concentrate on success if one of these things is
going to work. The 1244 groups want to pull out the
minute the going gets rough."
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Similar objections to the provision were voiced by several
other subjects. Section 1244 is also viewed in some quarters as
having been partly responsible for the period of speculation which
ended in the market slump of May 1962. The reasoning is that
section 1244 attracted many amateurs into the venture capital
game who should never have been in at all - most of whom ultimately
got stung and got out.
Another class of objection to Section 1244 centered
around its limitations of application. One sometimes hears that
the aggregate capital limit is too low, or that the upper limit
on offering size is too low, or even that there should be pro-
visions made for later offerings under the same conditions. How-
ever, the author doubts that revision of any of these provisions
would substantially increase the flow of initial capital to new
ventures, simply because the vast majority of such ventures, es-
pecially research-based ones, fall well below the prescribed limits.
The influence of Section 1244 is extremely difficult to
measure objectively. One could count the number of 1244 offerings
which have ocgurred in the past five years, but there is no way
to tell how many of these offerings would have been made anyway.
Thus, the opinion of investors remains our best guide, and that
opinion is predominantly that 1244 plays a rather minor role in
influencing willingness to invest.
A second tax incentive created by the "Small Business
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Investment Act of 1958" is the so-called "Subchapter S" of Internal
Revenue Code Chapter One. This provision allows corporations with
fewer than ten shareholders to elect to have their profits or
losses charged directly to stock holders. Thus, in effect, a
closely-held corporation can elect to be taxed as a partnership.
Once an election is made and terminated it cannot be utilized
again for five years unless special permission is obtained from
the IRS.
The possibility of charging company losses against personal
income is, of course, the feature which should make Subchapter S
most attractive to venture investors. However, the present survey
provides no evidence that it is of any real importance in influencing
the willingness of individuals to invest. This tax feature was not
mentioned spontaneously once during the interviews; moreover, none
of the few subjects questioned about it appeared to be aware of
Subchapter S or its effect. One investor, after the author had
briefly explained Subchapter S, reflected a moment and then ob-
served that if he'd wanted to be taxed as a partner he'd probably
have organized a partnership - especially since they could always
become a corporation or elect to be taxed as one. Thus, the
author is forced to conclude that Subchapter S is a very minor
influence on the investment decision. Unlike Section 1244, how-
ever, the limited influence of Subchapter S can probably be
attributed to a lack of general knowledge about it. Whether with
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Chapter IX
PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT
"Further evidence of the strong emphasis placed
on management participation by investors in new
ventures (was revealed by the study). Three
hundred and ninety-eight individuals, about
53% of the sample, reported that they had in-
vested in a new venture at some time during
their lives. Nearly two-thirds of these per-
sons, however, had participated directly in the
management of the enterprise in which they had
invested; moreover, a considerably larger per-
centage of the persons investing substantial
amounts than of individuals investing small
amounts had so participated." I
The study of Butters, et al, clearly indicated that the
desire to participate was an important component of the decision
to invest. Yet their study focused on the numbers of individuals
in their sample who had somehow participated in management of
their portfolio companies, without specifying the type or extent
of that participation. It will be the purpose of this chapter
to examine both the type and extent of management participation
by some different sorts of investors, and to offer a few evalu-
ative comments where appropriate.
J. Keith Butters, L. E. Thompson, and L. L. Bollinger, Effects of
Taxation-Investments by Individuals, Division of Research, Graduate
School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1953.
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There are basically two reasons for the decision to par-
ticipate in enterprise management.
a) The investor desired a useful and creative managerial
role, with its rewards and satisfactions in terms of
putting something together, making it grow, en-
couraging gifted technologists, and a general sense
of the excitement of participation.
b) The investor feels that his presence is needed to
protect his investment. Either at the outset or
later in the organization's development he may
conclude that management lacks some important ele-
ments which he can supply.
Normally the investor's motivation includes components
of each. Some interesting differences in tendency and emphasis
exist, however, between institutional and individual investing.
Participation by the Venture Capital Groups
Among the family investment groups, investment companies,
and SBIC's, examples of both types of participation can be found.
However, the second, defensive, type of participation is by far
the more frequent. This is because participation in company
management is expensive, and in a profit-motivated venture capital
organization, the less participation needed the better. Thus,
participation is usually indulged in only when the investment
group considers it indispensible.
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The venture capital groups expect to participate to some
degree in the management of nearly every venture they back. During
the first year or two (often called the "hand-holding period"),
the venture group's representatives may meet with company manage-
ment as often as twice a week to discuss problems of operation,
finance, and planning. Even more frequent contact by telephone
is not unusual in periods involving many decisions of some im-
portance. After a period, the amount of participation by the
capital group gradually tapers off, to the point where the new
enterprise can stand unassisted. An officer of one major venture
capital group sketched their typical pattern of participation as
follows:
Group's
Participation
Group invests
Time
1 yr. 2 yrs. 3 yrs.
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This group, however, was qualified to provide a rather
broad selection of services to the companies they backed. Thus,
their participation in the early years was somewhat constant.
The more typical case, however, is that in which the investing
group can only make contributions of a more restricted type and
hence will participate most on those occasions when they are
needed (e.g., during periods of finance negotiation, or of
market development, or of establishing manufacturing facilities).
Thus, their participation tends to be intermittent - intensive
at times, slight at others.
The most customary vehicle for participation is the
directorship of the company. The venture group usually assigns
one or two staff men to follow a particular company, and those
men will be made directors. They will be expected to know as
much as possible about the personnel, technology, and markets
of the venture. They are also expected to follow developments
in the firm in as great detail as is feasible, ideally keeping
as much abreast of development as management. To the extent that
these directors have technical training or prior knowledge of the
type of business and industry, they can be quite helpful to the
management of the new firm. It was acknowledged on several
occasions, however, that the director whose background was pri-
marily financial was rather limited in potential contributions.
It should be noted parenthetically that some venture groups do
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not want even a single director on the board, preferring to keep
their participation less formal.
There are several interesting types of relationships which
develop between company management and the venture capital group.
For example, some groups will give a staff man a leave of absence
of one to several months to fill a vacant management role in the
company (i.e., controller or treasurer). At least two of the
groups represented in the interviews currently had staff men on
leave in just this situation. Another not infrequent relation-
ship of venture group to company management is that of paid con-
sultant. Such arrangements are not uncommon among SBIC's and
may actually be included as a condition of financing.
Representatives of several venture groups were asked how
much time such hand-holding activity normally required. The
usual answer was that about a third of the total staff time was
normally devoted to assisting the portfolio companies, although
this figure appeared to be higher for groups with wide geographical
distribution in their portfolios. The remaining two-thirds of the
group's time was typically divided about evenly between searching
for new situations and general administrative problems.
Not every investment group expects to contribute this
kind of management effort to the new venture. A senior partner
of one family investment group said,
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"We like to regard ourselves simply as the
financial vice president of the firm we
back. We leave operations mostly to com-
pany management, since the only reason why
we invest at all is because we have faith
in them."
However even this group will step in, in cases of unusual difficulty.
Moreover, as suggested earlier, not every company in the typical
portfolio receives this kind of attention. Nearly every invest-
ment group has investments which are approaching maturity and which
require virtually no servicing. These are often the most profitable
investments in the portfolio.
Participation by Individuals
The extent to which individuals expect to participate in
company management varies enormously and is difficult to predict.
It would be reasonable to expect, for example, that the most
economically-motivated investor would be the most likely to in-
sist on participating in company management. The survey suggests,
however, that the case is just the opposite: that the non-economic
individual investor is most likely to want to participate, and that
the economically-motivated individual either has more profitable
uses for his time, or has so little to lose if the company fails,
that he participates only very slightly.
The extreme case of investor participation is the case
where the more or less affluent entrepreneur finances his own
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firm. This is not a pattern encountered frequently, although ex-
amples of this type of investor were included in the survey sample.
Such people are normally motivated by the desire to participate
constructively in a growing firm, although their motives are
economic to the extent that they believe greater gains are possible
from their own ventures than from those of others.
The more usual case is the investor who wishes to be con-
sidered by management as a consultant, either paid or unpaid, on
matters of policy or perhaps of technical detail in an area where
he has special abilities. This type of participation is not nor-
mally economically motivated. Such an investor can be genuinely
helpful to the new firm, both as an operating advisor and as a
window on the financial and legal problems of business. This is
a role often preferred by the senior or retired businessman, who
does not desire a full-time commitment to the enterprise.
Less usual but not uncommon is the case in which the
investor desires a role as a full-time officer of the firm he fi-
nances. While such a man is often highly qualified for the role
he seeks in the company, problems have been created in several
situations by such a relationship. A company will sometimes
accept the investor's participation as a condition of obtaining
capital, only to discover that personality conflicts are created
in what was theretofore a congenial, smoothly-functioning group.
Thus, the admonition "Choose your bedfellows with care", applies
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particularly to the situation where a man's resources may tend to
make the entrepreneur oblivious to some rather obvious future
difficulties.
At the other extreme is a minority comprised of the
individual who invests with no intention whatever of participating
in the new venture's management. He may have invested because a
friend asked him to, because he thought it would be worthwhile
to take a flier on a recommended venture, because he has little
to lose due to his tax situation, or because it's fun to back a
winning horse or, more accurately, a horse in a race. Whatever
his motivation, he tends to rely rather heavily on his judgment
of people - and his people, once selected, can run their own
show. This study discovered no evidence to suggest that this
type of investor does any worse, on the average, than anyone
else. Moreover, his non-participation as "silent partner" is
welcomed by one type of entrepreneur, though for many it would
probably be undesirable. Some typical comments on participation
were:
"Most of the time in these things you only go
in because you have confidence in the manage-
ment. You can help if they yell, but they're
ninety percent on their own."
"I don't participate much - takes too much
time. I'm betting on people who should be
able to run their own show."
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The period during which individuals seem to feel that
their participation is most necessary varies substantially with
the situation, but appears to range between one and three years.
Relationships may be much longer, but the real difficulties of
transition to a going concern are usually encountered sometime
in the first three years, and it is during this period that most
investors seem to consider their contributions to be most im-
portant.
It was the author's impression that today a rather higher
level of management participation is accepted than was customary
as recently as two years ago. This impression may be simply a
function of the sample of investors interviewed. Or, more likely,
it is due to the fact that the unsophisticated investor, poorly
qualified to select and follow good venture possibilities, is
largely out of the market today, leaving only the more wily in-
vestors who were participating in management all along.
In general it appeared to the author that, on the whole,
participation by the institutional or individual investor in NRBE
management is widespread and often beneficial. It can be bene-
ficial primarily because it gives the entrepreneur access to
someone with knowledge and friends in areas which may be quite
foreign to the entrepreneur, such as finance, law, marketing,
control, or government procurement. Also, the investor is very
often older than the group he backs, and is thus able to function
as a ''super-director," bringing experience and a seasoned view-
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point to many situations which may be new to the entrepreneurs.
The phenomenon of management participation by investors
is one of the features which make new enterprises different in
kind, as well as in size, from other types of enterprise. The
investor here is frequently offering the new enterprise a good
deal besides his money; he is often investing his time, energy,
and experience as well - assets which in many instances are
valuable to the enterprise beyond any price. His appraisal of
the opportunities afforded by a venture situation to capitalize
upon these assets, as well as his financial ones, may often be
the determining factor in his decision to participate.
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Chapter X
DEFINITION AND ATTAINMENT OF SUCCESS
"In all the different employments of stock, the
ordinary rate of profit varies more or less with
the certainty or uncertainty of the returns....
The ordinary rate of profit always rises more of
less with the risk. It does not, however, seem
to rise in proportion to it, or so as to compen-
sate it completely. Bankruptcies are most fre-
quent in the most hazardous trades. The most
hazardous of all trades, that of a smuggler,
though when the adventure succeeds it is like-
wise the most profitable, is the infallible
road to bankruptcy. The presumptuous hope of
success seems to act here as upon all other
occasions, and to entice so many adventurers
into these hazardous trades, that their compe-
tition reduces the profit below what is suff-
icient to compensate the risk." 1
-Adam Smith
A central purpose in conducting the survey described in
this report was to learn something of the definitions of success
employed by the backer of scientific ventures, and of his batting
average as he himself views it. Peripheral to this is the additional
issue of "what do you do with a success once you have one?", a
question sometimes rather more awkward to deal with than might be
expected.
1 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, London, 1776.
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Defining Success
The mere fact that someone embarks upon an enterprise
usually (though not necessarily) implies that he has some defi-
nition of success in mind. Often success in an enterprise is
so clear-cut (or binary) in nature that its attainment is app-
arent to everyone (e.g., the Wright Brothers' plane flies;
Peary reaches the South Pole; I win the toss of a coin). More
often, and especially in economic enterprises, there are in-
numerable things that can be measured as indices of success, and
innumerable levels of each of these things which may be con-
sidered as arbitrary targets defining it. What constitutes a
very successful venture for one investor might be only medi-
ocre to another, and a clear-cut failure to a third.
The venture capital groups all tend to measure the same
things in defining success, although they recognize different
levels of these things as constituting success. Rate-of-return
is the usual parameter for venture groups as it is for most other
businessmen. The most usual rate-of-return given in the survey
as indicating "success" is about twenty percent annual appreciation
(or doubling one's money in four to five years). Both Rubinstein
and the Federal Reserve System reported this number in their res-
pective studies as being an "investor's consensus" and it was heard
often in the present one. It is doubtful, however, that the expec-
tations for any single venture are often that low - simply because
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most research ventures appear either to make a good deal better
return than this, or a good deal worse one. Thus, while twenty
percent per year might constitute some sort of average portfolio
appreciation target for some investment groups, it is not likely
that a single venture making this return will be judged an en-
ormous success. Most groups with portfolios of such investments
appear to regard as successes those ventures which appreciate by
a multiple of ten or twenty in the first five years - and these
are the statistically rare investments which must be relied upon
to offset the others and keep the organization in business. An
appreciation of twenty percent on a single investment of a single
individual, on the other hand, might be considered quite good.
The number, "five years" is another figure onwoften hears,
but one to which additional qualifications must be appended. The
typical statement,"I'm willing to wait about five years", immedi-
ately elicits the question, "Wait five years for what? Writing
it off as a capital loss? Unloading one's stock in a public
offering? Putting additional money into the company? Giving
the stock away? Any "maximum waiting time", to be meaningful in
a definition of success, must be considered within the context of
what the investor hopes to do with his equity at the end of that
time.
Among the venture capital organizations, as among indi-
viduals, there are substantial goal-related differences in the
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answer to the question, "How long?". Some SBIC's feel that if a
company hasn't shown indications of making a profit by the third
year, it's time to get out - regardless of the consequences to
the company. An officer of another venture organization expressed
a somewhat different view: "We stay in until it's clear that the
situation is so good or so bad that we can no longer make a contri-
bution." Another organization, a well-known family venture group,
regards ten years as an altogether reasonable waiting time, but
in fact expects to hold some investments much longer. A criterion
somewhat moie sophisticated than most was mentioned three times
in the survey: Stay in only during the steepest part of the
growth curve - then get into something else. However, while the
theoretical underpinnings of this criterion are above all criti-
cism, it is the author's opinion that this criterion for success-
ful investing is a rather difficult one to put into practice.
When an investment's growth is flattening out is precisely what
every investor wants to know.
After discussing rate-of-return and time period as success
criteria, we are now forced into the rather nebulous region which
contains most of the others. At one time or another, each of the
following criteria for investment success was mentioned in an
interview. While it is impossible to assess their importance,
relative to other criteria as well as to each other, a listening
of them should project some sense of their flavor and diversity.
They include:
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1. Just keeping the company in business for
some length of time.
2. Getting the company to simply show a
profit, however small.
3. "Breaking even" on one's investment(!)
4. Making as much as would have been made
investing the money with the rest of one's
assets.
5. Getting a new product on the market.
6. Attaining a public stock issue.
7. Getting a company to the point where it's
self-sustaining.
8. Building the volume to the point where it
will support the investor-manager on a
good salary.
9. Building sales to a certain fraction of
the market.
10. Keeping things going until a bigger
company offers to buy you out.
11. Keeping any unambiguous failures off your
record.
It will be noted that most of these are not economic cri-
teria. Moreover, itis doubtful that any single one constitutes
the sole measure of success for any investor. However, the mere
fact that they occurred in the study suggests that many individual
investment ventures are not being judged by economic criteris alone
(perhaps a result of rationalizing past experiences). It suggests
also that very few venture capitalists expect to grow significantly
richer through their participation - again emphasizing the very
important non-economic side of investor motivation.
It was interesting also to observe that success criteria
often change during the period of the investor's participation.
The author, however, was unable to discover any pattern or general
tendency toward either increasing or decreasing emphasis of economic
criteria in these instances.
The Score
We turn now to the final substantive question of this study.
That question is, "How well have they done?". While it is recog-
nized that many of the investors of initial capital in new ventures
may reap enormous returns in non-economic terms from their ventures,
such yardsticks of success are, by their very individuality, rather
poor for comparing one man's record with another's. Since there
is very little unanimity upon the non-economic criteria, we shall
focus upon the major economic one: rate of return.
Discussions of the experiences of venture backing in
general, and in particular, of initial backing of science based
ones, tend naturally to be rather indeterminate. It is somewhat
like asking how, in general, bettors do at the racetrack. The
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answer is that some win and some lose, with the majority about
breaking even. Yet this tells us nothing, unless we know some-
thing about the characteristics of the people in each group -
characteristics from which we can draw inferences - perhaps that
one group has better ways of picking winners - or, perhaps, only
that one group is luckier than another.
Whatever the reasons for success, failure and their dis-
tribution, this much is clear: the venture capital investors
probably cannot expect a higher rate-of-return on their in-
vestments than can investors in any other segment of the capital
market. On the average, the increased risks appear only to be
about compensated by the occasional outstanding success - or per-
haps not quite compensated, as with Adam Smith's smugglers. 2
The venture capital organizations constitute a likely
place to begin, since information on many of them is publicly
available, and since, as highly sophisticated, well-staffed organi-
zations, they may well constitute a guide to how well other investors
of only average endowments might expect to fare.
American Research and Development Corporation, a con-
spicuous and well managed venture capital firm, has had a reasonably
successful experience since their establishment in 1946. Had their
stock been purchased at the original offering at $8.33 and held,
2 See the Federal Reserve System's 1958 study, Financing Small Busi-
ness for documentation of returns to small business investors vs.
returns to all others.
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the investor would have experienced appreciation of about nine
percent per year (including cash dividends, and a distribution
of stock in an outstanding early investment). This is a good
return, compared to many venture groups' experience - but on
the other hand, the annual compound appreciation for that
period of Standard and Poor's Industrial Average is in excess of
eleven percent, suggesting that ARD investors might have done
just as well in a number of other situations.
The publicly-traded SBIC's as a group have not done
quite so well. The SBIC Evaluation Service's "SBIC Stock Price
Index", which has been computed since October 1960, shows that an
investment in October 1960 in a portfolio comprised of index
stocks would have depreciated at a rate of sixteen percent per
year; had this same portfolio been purchased during the specula-
tive spring of 1961, the depreciation would have been more like
seventy-five percent per year. Most SBIC's today are selling
at substantial discounts from book value, averaging thirty-eight
percent, according to the SBIC Evaluation Service.
The family investment groups are more difficult to general-
ize upon since few figures are publicly available. However, we do
have a few data points to give us some sense of the whole. We men-
tioned in an earlier chapter the not-altogether-happy experiences
of J. H. Whitney and Company, a group no longer active in new
venture financing. Another group, Rockefeller Brothers, is gener-
ally thought by the financial community to be among the most
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successful. A spokesman for the group was recently quoted in
Barron's as saying,
"...the Rockefeller batting average on risk in-
vestments remains at .900 as far as successes
and failures are concerned, or right where it
was two years ago." 3
The spokesman failed to comment upon the group's rate-of-return,
but one might infer that it is satisfactory from the fact that
the organization has in recent months added four new ventures to
its portfolio. Several of the other family groups appear to
have done reasonably well up until about two years ago, since
which time several have sustained sizable paper losses on their
science stocks.
So much for the venture capital organizations. Let us
now turn to the record of the individual investor, the man who
supplies initial capital to New England's NRBE's. The problem
of appraising success in terms of rate-of-return is exceedingly
difficult to approach on the basis of interviews alone; it is
quite doubtful that any individual knows his rate-of-return.
Even given the financial statements of every firm in a man's
present and past portfolio, it would be extremely difficult to
compute such a rate, simply because of the impossibility of
"Unshaken Confidence - Laurence Rockefeller Remains Firmly
Wedded to His Scientific Ventures," Barrons, June 24, 1963.
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evaluating stock for which there is no market. However the present
study attempted a zero-order approximation of individual investor
experience, based upon responses from one part of the sample: that
part comprised of individuals known to have invested initial money
in new ventures on their own behalf. The sub-sample contained ten
such individuals. Their characterization of their own experience
is reported as stated or implied during the course of the inter-
views:
NRBE INVESTMENT EXPERIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR SUBSAMPLE
Professional Clearly About Clearly
Group Successful Broke Even Unsuccessful
Industrial a 3 0
Financial b 3 1 2
a. Includes company presidents and chairmen.
b. Includes bankers, investment bankers, brokers
and investment counsellors.
While it is difficult to infer much from such a tabulation, the
author went further and estimated the number of situations in
which each investor had participated (in some instances this
was known with certainty; in others a best guess sufficed).
It was concluded that the six clearly successful investors had
to their credit an estimated twenty-nine investments; those
-120-
breaking even, about eight; the two unsuccessful investors, only
two! Thus, it appears that, at least in this tiny sample, the
investors did best who gave the laws of probability a chance to
work a bit. One of the individuals in this subsample concluded
that,
"Most sophisticated investors in my position
have definitely made money, although not so
much as they would have made by investing in
proven issues on the New York Stock Exchange."
It would be a mistake to attempt any sweeping inference
from the experience of this group since, as mentioned before, the
sample was undoubtedly biased toward the successful investor, by
virtue simply of the fact that he stays in the market long enough
to be identified. One might argue from the available evidence,
however, that the investor who stays in long enough to give
probability a chance does better than the process average would
predict - simply because of the others who get out when the first
venture turns out badly. Some portion of the bad ventures get
absorbed by this second group, but none of the good ones. The
distribution of these two groups in the investor population, as
well as the magnitude of this effect, would be difficult indeed
to estimate.
A Postscript on "Getting Out"
At the outset of this chapter we discussed the time-
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criterion of success, and the contingency of its relevance upon
what the investor planned to do at the end of that time. The
"getting out" part of a venture is not typically uppermost in
the mind of the investor entering his first NRBE venture. How-
ever, after one or two, he is likely to give a good deal more
thought to just how he's going to get out of any additional
venture he enters. As one investor put it,
"If more people thought about how they would
get out of these things, there'd be a lot
fewer getting in. Usually the first public
issue is simply to get them out - then it's
the public that gets hooked."
There is often a real problem for the investor in getting
out, even if the venture is a highly successful one. For example,
take the case of an investor who provides a substantial portion
of the initial equity money of a new firm. The firm prospers,
and for five years the investor waits for his reward. At last
a public offering is arranged, at a price which promises a sub-
stantial appreciation on his original investment. But what should
he do now? Include his stock in the public offering? Probably
not a good idea, because neither the underwriters nor the next
group of investors will be happy at seeing the original capital
pull out - because then the company is little better off than be-
fore. Should he attempt to sell his stock privately? Probably
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not, because the dumping of a major piece of the stock will simply
drive down whatever its tiny market may be, thus jeopardizing both
his gains and the underwriting. Should he just plan to leave his
money in the company awhile longer? Probably not, because the
major burst of capital appreciation has passed, and if he is really
a venture capitalist, he will want his funds to place in other
risk situations. Clearly, a dilemma confronts him.
The resolution of this dilemma will depend in part on
the condition of the market at the moment, partly on the tax
structure of our investor, and to a large degree, on the kind of
person he is. One very successful investor reported that his best
course was simply to wait until the market for his stock had
peaked, then give it away to a charity, claiming a tax deduction.
Two other investors felt that they had a distinct obligation to
the company to hold their stock until the second public offering,
then get out.
If a successful venture poses a moderate problem of
getting out, the marginal venture poses an enormous one. The
marginal company is an enterprise that never failed, yet some-
how never quite succeeded either; it stays in business but never
grows. The dilemma that confronts the patient investor here is
a rather less pleasant one than the first. He can a) leave his
money in, making little or no return, or b) insist, if possible,
on being bought out by the other stockholders, or c) try to find
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an outside investor who will buy the stock at any price, or
d) attempt a coup to liquidate. The first possibility is
probably not attractive to the investor at all, the last
three will probably not be greeted with enthusiasm by manage-
ment; none is a happy solution for everyone. One man inter-
viewed expressed his formula for dealing with such problems:
"The secret of success in getting out of
a venture deal is to find someone who's
a bigger fool than you are."
In summary, generalizations on the ways in which in-
vestors define success and on their experiences in achieving it
are doomed to run aground on a shoal of exceptions and special
cases. The present chapter has outlined a few of the more
common success criteria, discussed the experiences of a sub-
sample of the investor population studied, and offered some
comments on the sometimes tricky problem of getting out of the
successful or not-so-successful venture. It was hoped at the
outset that the study would provide a better basis for the
judgment of investor experience in NRBE; this hope was par-
tailly though not entirely fulfilled. Innumerable opportunities
for further research in this topic exist - and especially, in the
study of patterns of success and failure among different groups
and types of investors. It is the author's hope that this chapter
has constituted a modest first step in this direction.
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Postlogue:
SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR ENTREPRENEURS
At the end of any research effort, after the findings and
conclusions have been tabulated and catalogued, one question often
remains unasked - a question that is both appropriate and important
for the researcher to have answered: "Interesting, but what did
you learn that is useful?". The author hoped at the outset that
this study might prove of some value to both the investor and the
entrepreneur. Throughout the chapters that precede, every effort
has been made to discharge this promise to the investor, yet the
implications for the entrepreneur remain rather less explicit.
It is the purpose of this postlogue, then, to focus as directly
as possible upon those aspects of the study of the most immediate
interest to the technical entrepreneur looking for backing.
At some risk of appearing didactic, the author advances
the following guidelines to entrepreneurs in the belief that their
importance and generality of application warrant their consider-
ation by most entrepreneurs before approaching the capital market.
1. Do your homework thoroughly
This applies to both the conception and the presentation of
your project. The conception should include many aspects besides
the technical feasibility of the innovation. One should have in
-125-
hand a working prototype of the device, as well as a clear notion
of the type of organization required to make it a commercial success.
The latter will be the more difficult for the technologist, for it
takes him into areas where he may have no first-hand experience.
He should have a fair idea about how one manufactures such an
innovation, who the subcontractors should be, what the costs are
likely to be. He should already have made a choice of colleagues
in the enterprise, selecting them both for personal compatability
and complementarity of talents. He should know as much as possible
about his ultimate market - how many widjets might be bought, and
at what price? How fast might they be demanded? Who else is likely
to be selling them? What happens to demand in five years? What
other things can we sell to this market? How do things get dis-
tributed and sold in it? How much money is required to reach it?
And very important, Who is our first customer going to be? Can
we sign him up before we make the first one? It is often diffi-
cult to answer many of these questions before approaching the
capital market, but at the very least one should evince awareness
of them as well as a clear-cut plan for obtaining answers soon.
The best-laid plans await a bleak fate unless they are
well presented. The engineer who expects his idea to sell it-
self on the basis of a few sketches and some arm-waving is doing
justice neither to himself nor his idea. The people who back
technical entrepreneurs are not, for the most part, technically
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trained - but neither are they fools - and the best evidence of
man's ability to sell his device to a market is his ability to
sell it to them. The documentation of the project should include
drawings and descriptions of the innovation, presented in non-
technical (but non-patronising!) language directed at a knowledge-
able reader. Its applications should be discussed. A prospectus
should include presentations of cost estimates, projected sales,
market growth, etc., in the language of the businessman - that is,
in terms of pro forma balance sheets and operating statements for
the next few years, backed up by sufficient detail to at least be
convincing. The sources of sales estimates should be documented.
The projections should be related to industry growth, government
contracting trends, etc. Magnificence of presentation is not
necessary, but neatness and thoroughness are. And finally, the
project prospectus should be capable not only of informing the
prospective backers, but also of creating some enthusiasm.
2. Pick your prospects carefully
Knocking on doors at random is a poor way to sell anything,
new technical enterprises included. Though it seems obvious,
many entrepreneurs fail to ask themselves even the most ele-
mentary questions about what constitutes the best type of backing
to the enterprise. How much money is needed? How much control
am I willing to part with -to get it? How much management assis-
tance will be needed? How soon will additional funds be needed?
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How long will it be before the investor can expect a return? And
finally, who are the people who have money available on these
kinds of terms?
In identifying these people, it may be helpful to talk to
other entrepreneurs, to bankers, to acquaintances in the financial
world, or to any other knowledgeable person likely to be helpful
to you in assembling your list of prospects. This list, once
assembled, will be the basis of even more homework. What kinds
of ventures have they backed? What does their record look like?
How well are they liked by other people whom they've backed?
How soon do they have to show a return? How patient are they?
What advisory assistance can they offer? How much ownership will
they want? And finally, how would they view a proposal like mine
coming in off the street? It is an enormous tactical advantage
to the entrepreneur to know a few of the answers before approaching
a prospective investor. He should be aware of the many different
types of venture capital that are available, the different organi-
zations that exist for its administration, the types of bargains
other people have been able to drive with them recently, and the
standards by which they judge proposals. In short, the entrepreneur
should know their game as well as his own.
3. Get some professional help
There's no need to go into a capital search completely alone.
A good banker and a good lawyer will be indispensible sooner or
later, so why not pick them now? Correctly chosen, they can be
powerful allies in the search. They have probably been through
the capital-search mill with entrepreneurs before, and it's
their business to know their way around the financial community.
They can advise you and help you sidestep pitfalls you wouldn't
have thought existed.
This help won't cost very much, so get the best available.
The banker won't cost anything, and he wants you to succeed so
that he can lend you money when you've succeeded. The lawyer
also wants your business later on - and recognizing the finan-
cial peril of the new firm, he won't charge you a fortune to
help you get started. And he may put it on the cuff.
Picking the best isn't hard. In every community there
are a few banks and a few law firms noted for their interest in
new enterprises. Any senior member of the financial community
can tell you who they are.
In Conclusion,
Perhaps the most important thing for the entrepreneur to be
able to do is put himself in the shoes of the prospective backer -
then try to view the project as the investor will view it. The
success with which he can maintain this viewpoint in the con-
ception, presentation, and execution of his project will in-
evitably determine to a great degree the success of both the
enterprise and the entrepreneur.
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Appendix 1
SOME COMMENTS ON THE STUDY
The purpose of this brief section is to look at the study,
rather than its results, and to provide a spot for a few comments which
don't appear to have any other natural place in the body of this report.
As mentioned in the text, the non-structured interview can, in
the hands of a trained and experienced practitioner, be an effective,
if not precise, tool of research. Without the benefit of either training
or experience in the medium, I found that while I could glean and infer
a good deal of information from most interviews, I had the feeling that
with even some rudimentary training I could have been far more effective
at eliciting useful information. This impression was strengthened by
the fact that my later interviews seemed both easier and more generally
informative than the earliest ones.
As indicated in the first chapter, the general interview
strategy at the outset was to use a formal interview format question-
naire (see Appendix 2), to be completed by me during the course of the
interview. The object, of course, was to obtain a degree of compara-
bility between the responses of the different people interviewed.
After the first few interviews using this approach, however, it be-
came clear that the structured interview was not in this case an ideal
research vehicle. Not only did it necessitate hurrying the conversation
to get through all the topics, but it also tended to destroy the spon-
taneous conversational nature of the interview. The use of the inter-
view format was thereafter abandoned, with an overall improvement in
interview results.
The interview approach I then adopted could be best described
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as "loosely-structured" - that is, I attempted to encourage the inter-
view subject to take as much of the initiative as he was willing to
take, though I had firmly in mind a number of questions which I hoped
he would answer before we finished. When I felt that the conversation
was converging upon one of these questions, I attempted to elicit a
forthright answer on the subject; if it appeared that the discussion
might omit some of the general topics completely (e.g., risk estimation,
venture appraisal, tax considerations), I would attempt to steer the
conversation toward a topic of interest. It was not always possible
to accomplish this successfully, and many interviews ended with one
or more important points still uncovered. Nonetheless, while the mani-
fest content of the interview might in some cases fall short of what I
had hoped for, the latent content often permitted one to infer the
answers to some important questions with a fair degree of confidence.
The loosely-structured interview strategy had still another
dividend, in terms of information for which I would not myself have
thought to ask. In exploratory research (which is how I classify
this effort) it is not usually possible to identify, a priori, all
the right questions to ask. The loose interview structure permitted
on several occasions discussions at length of topics about which I
had little knowledge, or even basis for asking informed questions
(some topics so discussed were "finders", and problems of "getting
out"). Thus, I consider this interview form to be an appropriate
research method at least for this population, and I consider the
spontaneity and gratuitous references well worth their price in ex-
plicit information content.
It was recommended to me at the outset that I employ a tape
recorder to transcribe the interviews. This has been used successfully
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by some investigators, notably Professor Challis Hall of Yale, in con-
ducting personal interviews of businessmen. In concept it is excellent:
it should relieve the interviewer of some of his note-taking burden, and
permit lavish direct quotation in the study, thus maintaining the flavor
as well as the substance of the ideas. In practice, however, the re-
corder proved unsuccessful - at least on the two occasions when I
attempted to use it. On each occasion, the subject cordially refused
to permit our discussion to be recorded, in each case due to a simple
reluctance to go "on the record." After these experiences, it was my
judgment that no further attempt to record interviews should be made -
that the subjects either would refuse to be interviewed with it, or
would be made uncomfortable by its presence, thus destroying the
spontaneity of the discussion.
It seems desirable, with so small a sample, to attempt to
typify the individual and organized venture capital sources contacted
in somewhat more detail than appeared in the text. It was with some
hesitation that Tables 1 and 2 were prepared for this purpose, but it
is hoped that, in the context of this report, they will serve to add
some flesh and blood to the otherwise somewhat nebulous "investor
sample." The parameters estimated for the individuals and firms repre-
sent, in every case, my best estimate. Sometimes a parameter was
known with some certainty for several subjects, and merely guessed at
for the others, for symmetry's sake. In some cases, the characteri-
zation of the parameter in question indicated nothing more than my
assessment of a tendency (e.g., economic vs. non-economic motivation)
and projects no sense of magnitude. This, however, is an accurate re-
flection of the state of my knowledge of the facts, and I accept full
responsibility for the guesses, judgments and incomplete data represented.
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It is my hope that the benefits of these Tables' inclusion will
outweight whatever skepticism about the study they may incur.
Finally a few comments concerning the individuals them-
selves. As I stated in the early pages of this report, the people
interviewed were without exception cordial, candid, and generally
helpful. This was due, in part, to the selection-by-referral pro-
cess by which they were identified - it is doubtful that anyone
knowingly referred me to anyone who would not be helpful and
interested. Nonetheless, the excellent cooperation, and a very
high rate of acceptances of requests for interviews (80%) which
I received, lead me to the optimistic conclusion that this class
of individual presents a fertile field for further academic research
in such areas as the effects of taxation, the decision process under
uncertainty, the individual's risk-taking propensity, and others.
These people are typically well-educated, have broad interests,
and tend to be sympathetic to the aims of academic research (albeit,
in some cases amused as well). Thus, if the personal interview
is ever going to succeed as a research tool, it certainly should
here. But, to any who would undertake its use, I repeat my initial
admonition: know what you want to find out, and learn enough
about interviewing technique to find it out. Unfortunately, it
may be that the only way to learn it is by interviewing.
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Table 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS IN STUDY
Each had invested in at least one NRBE on his own account.
Investor Esti- Esti- Edu- Domi- Esti- Present Type Esti- % Time % of Any NRBE
mated Net mated cation nant mated Venture Search mated No. Manage- Net 1244? Econ-
Worth Income Moti- Years Activity Activity NRBE In- ment Worth omic
($1,000) ($1,000) vation Venture vestments Partici- in NRBE's Success
Investing pation
7 2 8 3 1 4 5 6 1, 9
A over 50 L.A. E 25 S Passive 4 20 20 No S$10,000
B 5,000 - 50 GSBA E 10 S Passive 6 15 20 Yes S
10,000
C 1,000 - 60 L.A. Non-E 15 S Passive 8 0 15 Yes S
5,000
D 1,000 - 40 L.A. Non-E 20 I Passive 1 0 71 No N
5,000
E 1,000 - 35 L.A. Non-E 40 S Active 8 10 15 Yes M
5,000
F 500 - 15 Tech Non-E 12 Q Active 4 100 80 No M1,000
G 500 - 75 Tech Non-E 10 I Passive 1 0 5 No N1,000
H 100 - 20 Tech Non-E 30 Q Passive 3 100 80 No S
500
I under 15 GSBA E 5 Q Active 2 10 50 Yes M
100
J under 15 GSBA E 6 Q Active 2 20 75 No M
100
1 Includes entire career 7 L. A. = Liberal Arts
2 Only economic and non-economic appraisal Tech = Engineering or Science
3 How subject located ventures GSBA = Graduate School of Business
4 Estimated fraction of work week Administration
5 At time of greatest activity 8 Quite Active, Somewhat Active, Inactive
6 "1244 offerings" participation 9 Success: Substantial, Moderate, None
Table 2: VENTURE CAPITAL ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTED IN STUDY
Firm Estimated Years in Search Total Management % Assets Investors' B.T.
Assets Venture Activity No. NRBE Participation Available Rate-of-Return
($ million) Finance Investment for Ventures (Estimated)
1 2 1
A over 100 4 Passive 10 0 under 1% 5
B over 50 18 Active 20 35% under 10% 12
C over 50 10 Passive 10 under 5% under 10% 5
D 20 - 50 17 Passive 78 35% 100% 9
E 20 - 50 4 Passive 32 30% 100% 8
F 20 - 50 17 Passive 50 10% 30% 8
G 10 - 20 17 Active 25 30% 100% 10
H 1 - 2 3 Passive 10 25% 100% 8
I 1 - 2 3 Passive 5 25% 100% 0
J - 2 3 Active 6 25% 100% 5
1 Includes entire period of venture activity
2 Fraction of total staff time per week
Appendix 2
Active Investors in New Research-Based Enterprises
INTERVIEW FORMAT FORM
(to be completed by interviewer during discussion)
Date
Firm
Occupation
Sex Age
MOST RECENT PARTICIPATION
1. I wonder if you would tell me something about your most recent small
enterprise venture?
2. What sorts of people were behind it? Were these the ideal people
for the job?
3. How did it come to your attention? (Personal friends, business
associates?)
4. How did you know the people involved were managerially and technically
competent?
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5. What was the technology involved? Do you try to stay within
this general area in investing?
6. Would you normally have invested at the outset or waited until the
company had established some sort of record?
7. Were you considering some other new venture situations when you chose
this?
8. Would you say the venture will have been a success or a failure?
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GENERAL VIEWS ON VENTURE FINANCING
1. About what percentage of one's total capital do you think it
wise to have invested in venture situations?
2. Why do you invest in new technical ventures, as opposed to other new
businesses?
3. What are the most important factors in making a particular venture
proposition attractive or unattractive to you? (good people? growing
industry? new technology?)
4. Has your willingness to make ventures of this type changed? How?
5. Would you say that taxes and the possibility of long-term capital
gains influence your decisions significantly?
Are taxes the most important consieration?
6. I assume you're aware of the special tax treatment offered new enter-
prise backers by so-called "Section 1244" of the Small Business Act
of 1958? (yes-no) _ (If no, explain and give dittoed copy of act)
If yes, ask: Has this tax incentive ever encouraged you to partici-
pate in a "1244 company"?
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7. How do you estimate the amount of risk associated with a venture?
Do you compare with other firms of the same general nature, or
with the industry, or do you draw mostly on your own judgment?
Whose opinion do you seek in estimating risk?
How much risk is appropriate in a venture of this kind?
a. What in your opinion constitutes a "successful" venture?
How long should payout be expected to take?
How big should payout be?
12. Do you normally expect to participate in the management of the venture
you back? To what extent?
13. Is it better to take on a venture alone, or to spread the risk among
several investors?
How do you usually hear about new venture situations?
About how long have you been interested in such situations?
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8.
9.
10.
11.
14.
15.
16. How many of them have you backed?
17. How good are scientists, engineers, and inventors as businessmen?
18. Do you think there should be businessmen as well as technical men
in a new venture?
19. Do you usually or ever insist that the promoters of a venture have
their own money, as well as yours, in it?
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___ - -1
OPINIONS ON OTHER BACKERS
OF NEW ENTERPRISE
1. About how many backers of new technical enterprise would you
estimate there are in Greater Boston?
2. What might be their average personal income tax bracket?
3. Would you say most made money or lost money in their ventures? Why
do they?
4. What do you think is their chief motivation for investing in a new
venture?
5. Considering all things, would you say that our personal and capital-
gains tax structure encourages or discourages the flow of capital to
new ventures?
6. Do you think the existing channels for putting investors in touch with
good potential investments are adequate?
How might the situation be improved?
-141-
PROPENSITY FOR RISK-TAKING
Just for fun, I'd like to present a hypothetical deal.
Let's say you're currently in the market for a promising venture
situation, and a colleague in the financial community suggests
this one: A group of well-qualified engineers and managers has
broken off from a large local electronics manufacturer. They
have a new technology and hold several fundamental patents.
They plan to sell proprietary devices to the civilian market,
but estimate that it will be two years before they can show a
profit. They need $50,000 but if the product performs to
promise, you estimate that the after-tax return to you in three
years will be $200,000. If the product misses, you'll probably
lose all $50,000.
You estimate that the product has one chance in ten to
hit. Would you take the venture?
What if it had two chances in ten?
Three?
Four?
Now I'd like to change the ground-rules a bit. Suppose
now that instead of an outlay of $50,000, you had only to invest
$10,000. The payoff is still $200,000, and you still think the
venture has about one chance in ten of hitting. Would you take it?
What if it had two chances in ten?
Three?
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Let me change the situation just one last time. Suppose
again that $10,000 were required, but that the potential after-
tax payoff were now only $50,000 instead of $200,000. Again you
estimate the chances of success at one in ten. Would you take
it?
What if they were two in ten?
Three?
Four?
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